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The importance of reliable and maintainable equipment 
in the hands of our service members cannot be overstated.  
Reliability has been identified as the life cycle cost 
driver for defense weapon systems.  Knowing that the 
reliability of a weapon system directly impacts upon that 
system’s operational capability and life cycle costs makes 
it of fundamental importance to the warfighter.  In 
recognition of its importance, it is mandatory for all 
program managers within the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
ensure their program accounts for the user’s reliability 
objectives.  However, reliability failures continue to 
disappoint operators, maintainers and testers of DoD 
systems. 
This thesis evaluates reliability management within 
the acquisition process of Naval Aviation programs.  
Reliability, logistical, and program management personnel 
directly involved with the issues of reliability management 
provided empirical insight to help the researcher identify 
root causes and risk mitigation techniques that are 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
managerial methods and practices used to optimize 
reliability of weapon systems in selected Naval Aviation 
acquisition programs.  Based on the aforementioned, a 
secondary purpose is to examine opportunities for 
improvement.  The objective of this endeavor is to 
determine how reliability management can best serve the 
ultimate acquisition goal of equipping warfighters with the 
tools they required while maximizing available resources.  
This analysis may lead to recommendations for 
implementation by acquisition workforce personnel. 
Examination of multiple aspects of reliability 
management will identify program risks and opportunities to 
mitigate those risks.  Ultimately the goal is to identify 
reliability management issues, which may affect reliability 




The 1998 National Research Council study of 
Statistics, Testing and Defense Acquisition recommended 
that, “The Department of Defense and the military services 
should give increased attention to their reliability, 
availability, and maintainability data collection and 
analysis procedures because deficiencies continue to be 
responsible for many of the current field problems and 
concerns about military readiness.” [Ref. 2]  In the period 
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between 1996 and 2000, approximately 80 percent of Army 
systems tested failed in excess of half of their 
reliability requirements during operational testing. [Ref. 
12] 
Reliability is a fundamental component of operational 
capabilities of weapon system, as well as a primary cost 
driver of that system’s life cycle costs (LCC).  Either of 
these issues is expected to be of the utmost concern to our 
nation’s warfighters.  The combination of operational 
capability and LCC makes the issue of weapon system 
reliability, a paramount concern for every acquisition 
professional.  The Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation has taken renewed efforts to improve the process 
of reliability testing in hopes of fielding operationally 
suitable systems to the end user. [Ref. 13] 
However, testing is only one tool available to a 
program.  Multiple opportunities are present throughout the 
acquisition life cycle to address reliability.  Beginning 
with the initial requirements development, through each 
iteration of the systems engineering process, and 
ultimately during post-production support reliability must 
be planned for, monitored, accessed, and improved during 
the maturation of a weapon system. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: 
What strategies should Program Managers implement to 
optimize reliability in their weapon system? 
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The subsidiary research questions are as follows: 
1. What is reliability and what is its significance 
within acquisition management? 
2. What policies and regulations governing 
reliability management are available to Program 
Managers (PM)? 
3. What significant factors contribute to weapon 
system reliability? 
4. What strategies are currently used to monitor 
reliability within an acquisition program? 
5. How can the program office mitigate risk 
associated with reliability throughout the 
acquisition life cycle? 
 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis examined reliability management from a 
program management perspective throughout the acquisition 
life cycle.  Governing policies and regulatory documents 
have been reviewed from the viewpoint of a PM with respect 
to applicability as a managerial tool.  The focus of the 
data collected will be from current systems in various 
stages of development managed at the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), and limited to managerial processes, 
tools and techniques.  This research is intended to 
identify both enablers and inhibitors of effective 
reliability management.  The resulting analysis will aide 
in the development of a set of conclusions and 
recommendations applicable to acquisition professionals in 




This thesis sought to determine the current 
environment for reliability management within Naval Air 
acquisition.  This task was accomplished through a thorough 
examination of literature, reports, and regulatory 
documents.  Additionally, the researcher obtained 
information through the conduct of personal and telephonic 
interviews with acquisition professionals. The final method 
of data collection was an electronic survey of specific 
acquisition programs managed at NAVAIR.  The survey used 
was a modification of a previously designed reliability 
performance survey intended to gather data from within a 
specific Army Program Executive Office in pursuit of 
similar research objectives. [Ref. 39]  
The information collected during the conduct of the 
reliability performance survey, was obtained through 
Government and contractor personnel who had first-hand 
experience with reliability management and/or reliability 
engineering.  Responses to the survey were instrumental in 
construction of this thesis.  Respondents provided a good 
cross-section of programs in various stages of the 
acquisition life cycle.  The questions posed were intended 
to emphasize the perspective of program management on the 
varied tasks involved with reliability management. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis contains five chapters. 
Chapter I provides an introduction to the subject of 
reliability and a basis for the study, outlining the scope, 
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methodology, and structure for conducting the analysis 
which will be used to address the research questions. 
Chapter II will provide a foundation of information on 
reliability, regulatory documents and opportunities to 
affect reliability throughout the acquisition life cycle. 
Chapter III will present the information obtained from 
the research conducted about the NAVAIR programs and the 
results of the reliability performance survey.  This data 
will indicate how the various programs have implemented 
reliability management processes and practices and will 
highlight significant examples and experiences. 
Chapter IV will provide the analysis of the collected 
data and identify the techniques and strategies used to 
manage reliability within the surveyed acquisition 
programs. 
Chapter V will present findings, address the primary 
and subsidiary research questions, and make conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The intended beneficiaries of this research are the 
warfighters within our military services, through the 
acquisition programs that manage reliability within their 
weapon systems.  The compilation of lessons learned and the 
identification of processes, policies and strategies 
pertaining to reliability management can assist any program 
attempting to apply risk management with respect to 
reliability performance. 
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The examination of common practices, issues, and 
concerns of programs wrestling with reliability issues will 
provide a stepping stone for improvement or root cause 
determination for future programs allowing them to 
capitalize on the lessons of their predecessors. 
  6
II. RELIABILITY OVERVIEW 
Reliability is the single most powerful lever in 
all logistics-if it doesn’t break it doesn’t need 
support  (Ref. 21) 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“Reliability isn’t everything, it is the only thing.” 
[Ref. 17]  The nature of National Defense and our system of 
Government, has led to a complex systems acquisition system 
that produces equally complex and expensive weapon systems.  
The costs of the weapon systems combined with the Nation’s 
requirement for defense dictate the need for highly 
reliable tools placed in the hands of trained warfighters.  
After spending in excess of 40 million in procurement 
dollars for an aircraft it simply is not feasible to 
discard the system when it does not work perfectly.  
Therefore, it is imperative to properly design and 
manufacture each system to optimize its reliability 
potential. 
This purpose of this chapter is to establish a common 
ground and set the stage for the discussion to follow about 
reliability management.  This will be accomplished through 
a presentation of background information intended to 
provide a fundamental understanding of reliability and its 
importance within systems acquisition.  Definitions of 
terms relating to reliability are provided to facilitate in 
understanding and consistency. 
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Mandatory and discretionary documentation have been 
identified and discussed.  Additionally, the discussion 
focuses on the importance of reliability management within 
systems acquisition and opportunities to optimize 
reliability will be highlighted 
 
B. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
Surprisingly, definitions, as well as the terms 
themselves, seem to vary depending on the user, service 
component, specific system program, or source 
documentation.  This seems to be unexpected knowing that 
the discipline of reliability falls in the realm of 
engineering, which tends to maintain uniform definitions 
even while measurement methods vary. [Ref. 7]  Prior to the 
1996 specification and standards reform, MIL-STD-721 
“Definition of Terms for Reliability and Maintainability” 
appropriately stood as a definitive authority.  After the 
cancellation of this standard several ‘authoritative’ 
sources are often quoted. 
The IEEE Reliability Society has yet to publish a 
commercial standard.  Mil-STD-785B “Reliability Program for 
Systems and Equipment Development and Production” remains a 
common reference, and portions of it often are included in 
the Statement of Work (SOW).  Rome Laboratories’ The 
Reliability Toolkit is an excellent reference, and is 
currently considered a commercial standard for practicing 
reliability engineers.  Finally, the Defense Systems 
Management College (DSMC) refers to the Reliability, 
Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) Dictionary, by 
Tracy Omdahl the Webster’s of RAM terms. [Ref. 7] 
There are more than 2000 terms defined in 
documents reviewed so far, many of which have the 
same meaning but different definitions.  (Ref. 
40) 
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It is therefore, important to have a solid 
understanding of terms and their usage, relative to a 
particular project.  The following common terms and 
concepts are provided to give the reader an understanding 
of terminology widely used within the practice of 
reliability. 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
(RAM).  Requirement imposed on acquisition systems to 
insure they are operationally ready for use when needed, 
will successfully perform assigned functions, and can be 
economically operated and maintained within the scope of 
logistics concepts and policies. [Ref. 10] 
Reliability.  The probability an item will 
perform its intended functions for a specified period under 
stated conditions.  Informally:  It does what it is 
supposed to, for as long as you need it.  Commonly 
quantified in terms of mean time between failure (MTBF). 
Mission Reliability.  The ability of an item to 
perform its required functions for the duration of a 
specified period.  Informally:  A measure of system’s 
ability to complete its mission. 
Logistics Reliability.  The probability that no 
corrective maintenance or unscheduled supply demand will 
occur following the completion of a specific mission 
profile.  Informally:  A measure of system’s ability to 






Logistics Reliability Mission Reliability 
• Measure of system’s 
ability to operate 
without logistics 
support 
• Measure of system’s 
ability to complete 
mission 
• Recognize effects of all 
occurrences that demand 
support without regard 
to effect on mission 
• Consider only failures 
that cause mission 
abort 
• Degraded by redundancy • Improved by redundancy 
• Usually equal to or 
lower than mission 
reliability 
• Usually higher than 
logistics reliability 
Table 1.   Reliability Requirements and Characteristics 
[From Ref. 38] 
 
Maintainability.  The probability that an item 
will conform to specified conditions within a given a given 
period when corrective or preventative action is performed 
IAW prescribed procedures and resources.  Informally:  It 
is quick and easy to fix when it breaks. 
Availability.  A measure of the degree to which 
an item is in operable and committable state at the start 
of a mission when the mission is called for at an unknown 
(random) time.  Informally:  It is there and working when 
you call upon it. 
Operational Availability (A O).  The probability 
that an item, when used under stated conditions in an 
actual operational environment, will operate satisfactorily 
when called upon.  Informally:  It is mission ready when I 
need it at any random time.  
Operational availability is a preferred readiness 
measure for weapon systems, because it reflects the real-
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world operating environment. [Ref. 37]  Commonly 
operational availability is considered:  AO=(Uptime)/(Uptime 
+ Downtime).  Downtime consists of both scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance and any administrative delays (e.g. 
time spent waiting for parts not in stock).  Therefore, AO 
is what system operators’ care most about--Performance on 
demand. 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF).  For a 
particular interval, the total functional life of a 
population of an item divided by the total number of 
failures within the population.  MTBF is the basic 
technical measure of reliability. [Ref. 10] 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC).  The total cost to the 
Government of acquisition and ownership of that system over 
its useful life.  It includes the cost of development, 
acquisition, operations, and support (to include manpower), 
and where applicable, disposal. 
 
C. POLICY AND REGULATIONS 
1. DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major 
Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition 
Programs  
 This regulation sets mandatory procedures to be 
followed by PMs and has specific identified reliability 
requirements: 
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The PM shall establish RAM activities early in 
the acquisition cycle. The PM shall develop RAM 
system requirements based on the ORD and TOC 
considerations, and state them in quantifiable, 
operational terms, measurable during DT&E and 
OT&E. RAM system requirements shall address all 
elements of the system, including support and 
training equipment. They shall be derived from, 
and support, the user’s system readiness 
objectives. Reliability requirements shall 
address mission reliability and logistic 
reliability. Availability requirements shall 
address the readiness of the system. 
Maintainability requirements shall address 
servicing, preventive, and corrective 
maintenance. 
The PM shall plan and execute RAM design, 
manufacturing development, and test activities so 
that the system elements, including software, 
used to demonstrate system performance before the 
production decision reflect the mature design. 
IOT&E shall use production representative 
systems, actual operational procedures, and 
personnel with representative skill levels. To 
reduce testing costs, the PM shall utilize M&S in 
the demonstration of RAM requirements wherever 
appropriate. 
This policy applies not only to the system, but 
also to technical manuals, spare parts, tools, 
and support equipment. [Ref. 14] 
 
2. DoD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System 
 
This directive describes management principles 
applicable to Defense acquisition programs, provides 
mandatory policies and procedures for the management of 
acquisition programs, except when statutory requirements 
override. 
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Logistics transformation shall be accomplished 
through… A support environment that maintains 
long-term competitive pressures; continuous 
improvement of weapon system reliability, 
maintainability, and supportability through 
technology refreshment and other means; and 
effective integration of weapon system-focused 
support to provide total mission logistics and 
optimum support to the user. Acquisition program 
managers shall focus on logistics considerations 
early in the design process to ensure that they 
deliver reliable systems that can be cost-
effectively supported and provide users with the 
necessary support infrastructure to meet 
peacetime and wartime readiness requirements. 
[Ref. 15] 
 
3. Military Standards and Handbooks 
 
In June 1994, the Secretary of Defense, Dr, William 
Perry, issued a memorandum entitled Specifications and 
Standards—A New Way of Doing Business.  This acquisition 
reform memorandum was aimed at the acquisition management 
community in an attempt to increase access to commercial 
state-of-the-art technology and to facilitate adoption of 
commercial best practices.  Specifically, the Secretary 
made an immediate policy change requiring programs to use 
performance specifications and non-Government standards.  
In cases where PMs determine that exact design solutions 
are required, and no suitable performance or commercial 
standard exists, they may use military standards only as a 
last resort and with the specific waiver approved by the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). [Ref. 34] 
Use of specifications and standards became available 
primarily as guidance to Program Managers.  It appears this 
was a significant shift in procedure.  The use of military 
standards had been a fundamental component of reliability 
engineering and management. 
The following is a list of frequently referenced 
military standards and handbooks (Mil-Stds/Hdbks) that, 
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although they have been cancelled, still remain an 
available reference on reliability: 
 
• MIL-HDBK-781D Reliability Test Methods, Plans, 
and Environments for Engineering, Development 
Qualification, and Production 
This handbook details techniques that may be 
used in reliability test programs but is for 
guidance only.  This handbook cannot be cited 
as a requirement. [Ref. 25] 
• MIL-STD-785B Reliability Program for Systems and 
Equipment Development and Production 
This military standard contains reliability 
tasks, requirements and rationale, which can be 
tailored to fit specific program needs. [Ref. 
26] 
• MIL-STD-1629A PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMING A FAILURE 
MODE, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA) 
 
 
4. Other Discretionary References 
 There are multiple discretionary references available 
to PMs depending on service and program specifics.  Listed 
below are discretionary references that have application 
across the spectrum of DoD acquisition programs: 
 
a. Defense System Management College (DSMC) 
Series of Technical Management Educational 
Guides. 
A family of guides written from a non-service 
specific perspective published by DSMC intended for use as 
instructional aides and as practical references to be used 
by acquisition professionals.  In both cases they are 
written for acquisition management personnel who are 
familiar with basic terms and definitions.  Used as a desk 
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reference, these manuals provide assistance to Government 
and industry personnel in the execution of their management 
responsibilities. The following guides have application in 
the management of reliability programs: 
1. Acquisition Logistics Guide (December 1997). 
2. Systems Engineering Fundamentals (January 2001). 
3. Defense Manufacturing Management Guide for Program 
Managers (April 1989). 
4. Test and Evaluation Management Guide (November 
2001). 
 
b. Rome Laboratory Toolkits 
The Rome Research Site, now part of a 
consolidated Air Force Research Laboratory system, was 
formerly known as Rome Laboratory.  Their Systems 
Reliability Division developed and published a toolkit 
intended for use by reliability and maintainability 
engineers.  The Reliability Engineer’s Toolkit (April 1993) 
is a widely used technical reference document as “an 
application oriented guide.” 
In 1995 the Rome Laboratory released an updated 
edition "Reliability Toolkit" Commercial Practices.  The 
latest edition takes a broader view of reliability 
engineering and management and addresses both commercial 
and military needs. [Ref. 37] 
 
5. Navy References 
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a. SECNAVINST 5000.2B, Implementation of 
Mandatory Procedures for Major and Nonmajor 
Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and 
Nonmajor Information Technology Acquisition 
Programs  
This document supports the DoD 5000.2-R 
instruction on reliability management.  Specifically RAM is 
identified as an integral part of systems engineering 
process, with emphasis placed on mission needs and reducing 
life cycle costs.  Some direction is provided in reference 
to reliability analysis. 
b. NAVAIR INSTRUCTION 4200.36B, Acquisition 
Plans 
This document provides policy and guidance on the 
construction of Acquisition Plans within NAVAIR.  
Reliability concerns are to be addressed by logistic 
considerations with reference to tailoring and quality 
assurance requirements. 
 
D. IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY AND 
MAINTAINABILITY (RAM) 
Reliability, maintainability and availability of a 
weapon system directly impact upon that system’s 
operational capability and life cycle costs, thereby making 
it of fundamental importance to the warfighter.  Because of 
its recognized importance, it is mandatory for all program 
managers within the Department of Defense to plan for and 
execute measures to ensure their program accounts for the 
user’s RAM objectives. [Ref. 14] 
The importance of reliable and maintainable equipment 
in the hands of military service members cannot be 
overstated.  Ultimately each system maturated through the 
DoD acquisition system, is statutorily required to be 
tested and evaluated to determine its operational 
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effectiveness and operational suitability.  Operational 
suitability most directly encompasses reliability and 
logistical considerations.  Informally a suitable weapon 
system has been defined as  
A system that is available for combat when 
needed, is reliable enough to accomplish its 
mission, operates satisfactorily with service 
personnel and other systems, and does not impose 
an undue logistics burden in peacetime or 
wartime. [Ref. 2]  
Essentially effectiveness equates to “Does it work?” 
while suitability equates to:  “Can we use, maintain, and 
support it?”  Suitability notably impacts the fielded 
weapon system; particularly in terms of life cycle costs.  
It is widely known, within the acquisition community, that 
the costs of operating and supporting (O&S) a weapon system 
far exceed the actual procurement costs incurred through 
the design, development and production of new systems.  
Figure 1 depicts a historical breakdown of life cycle costs 







Figure 1.   Life Cycle Cost Breakdown of a Typical Weapon 
System [From Ref. 31] 
The life cycle of a weapon system, which began with 
the initial determination of its need, continues through 
its design, development, production, deployment and 
concludes with the system’s disposal.  As shown in Figure 
1, the cost estimation categories are normally separated 
into four overlapping areas: 
• Research and Development.  Includes costs of 
studies; analysis; design; test and evaluation; 
pre-production article development; and 
documentation 
• Investment.  Accounts for all production and 
deployment costs including any required training 
and military construction. 
• Operations and Support.  Consists of all cost 
associated with usage and maintenance of the 
fielded equipment. 
• Disposal.  Although a relatively small percentage 
of LCC, and therefore often overlooked, this area 
accounts for demilitarization, destruction, or 
deactivation of the system. [Ref. 31] 
Many factors are involved with the estimation of life 
cycle costs.  Reliability considerations, estimates, and 
the accuracy of those estimates, play a significant role 
within each of the four overlapping cost estimation 
categories.  The fundamental objective of LCC reduction 
analysis is to identify the cost drivers that most 
significantly contribute to LCC.  This allows for trade off 
considerations with respect to different courses of action. 
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Although reliability, availability, and 
maintainability (RAM) are inextricably linked, even often 
thought of as a single issue, this research will primarily 
focus reliability.  This is because reliability has been 
determined to be the significant driver of O & S costs. 
[Ref. 2]  Each of these three fundamental logistics 
attributes is critical, but both maintainability and 
availability are directly affected by reliability. 
Reliability is the fundamental building block that 
either supports or hinders maintainability and 
availability.  Maintainability is focused on what happens 
when an item does break (unscheduled maintenance) and on 
the level of support required in preventing a system’s 
failure (scheduled maintenance).  Simply stated, in most 
cases the more reliable an item is, the less maintenance 
attention required.  Availability, as discussed previously, 
benefits from any reduction of time an item spends in a 
‘non-mission’ capable status (e.g. downtime).  Optimized 
reliability, assuming no significant corresponding rise in 
maintainability, will contribute to the optimization of 
availability. 
Currently the budget of the Defense Department is 
overwhelming consumed by high costs of O&S.  Knowing that 
60% to 85% of LCC is consumed in O&S expenditures, there 
has understandably been considerable effort to identify 
ways to reduce those costs.  The move to increase funds 
available for recapitalization and modernization of legacy 
systems, will be paid for substantially through the 
reduction in O&S costs.  Figure 2 depicts a Navy initiative 
to target methods to reduce O&S costs. 
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Figure 2.   Reducing O&S Costs [From Ref. 35] 
 
Reliability investments and initiatives are clearly on 
the critical path in the Navy’s O&S reduction plan.  
Reliability has been identified as a cost driver of O&S 
costs.  Figure 3 identifies the cost drivers the Navy 
intends to address in an effort to reduce O&S by 30 
percent.  Reliability improvements have been identified as 
an essential element in the effort to reduce O&S costs on 
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Figure 3.   Reliability as a Cost Driver [From Ref. 35] 
 
 
E. OPPORTUNITIES AND TOOLS FOR RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT  
Effective reliability management is achieved through 
the disciplined system’s engineering approach.  Systems 
engineering is an interdisciplinary approach to solve the 
life cycle technical problems within an Integrated Product 
Process Development (IPPD) framework. [Ref. 22] 
Systems engineering is the management function 
which controls the total system development 
effort for the purpose of achieving an optimum 
balance of all system elements.  It is a process 
which transforms an operational need into a 
description of systems parameters and integrates 
those parameters to optimize the overall system 
effectiveness [Ref. 9] 
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Combining the structured iterative format of systems 
engineering with the inter-disciplinary teaming inherent 
with the IPPD system, provides a program with an 
opportunity to employ optimum design, manufacturing and 
support practices. {Ref. 9]   
 
Figure 4.   R&M Fundamentals Timeline [From Ref. 30] 
 
Opportunities to influence reliability occur 
throughout a system’s life cycle.  Figure 4 depicts some of 
the reliability fundamental tools, techniques and documents 
from an acquisition life cycle timeline.  Each stage is a 
building block for the eventual fielding and operation of 
the equipment by the warfighter.  Like SEP itself, 
reliability management is an iterative task requiring 





1. Conceptualization, Design and Development 
The first, and most critical, opportunity to 
successfully manage reliability is at the conception of a 
need.  This is the beginning of the system’s life cycle 
and, an ideal place to have the greatest effect by 
considering reliability in the original design.  
Reliability requirements must be grounded in reality, 
accounting for system usage, expected operating 
environment, and available technology and resources.  The 
pursuit or acceptance of inadequate, overstated, or simply 
inaccurate reliability targets can be costly. 
The 1994 spec and standard reform not only made a 
significant change in document usage, it directed all 
acquisition decision makers to focus on the “problem rooted 
in the requirements determination phase.” [Ref. 34]  A 
fundamental comprehension of the ultimate user’s needs is 
required.  A system to be operated in space, aviation, or 
in a security function demands different reliability 
requirements than does an administrative computer desktop 
operating system or a coping machine.  Although the 
ultimate customer wants a reliable system in all 
circumstances, the consequence of system failures varies.  
Systems to be operated in space demand high, or ultra, 
reliability.  The cost of a failure, or even the 
opportunity for corrective action, is prohibitive. 
Once mission and environmental profiles have been 
established, the intended life of the system should be 
determined.  This has been a problematic issue for the 
Department of Defense, but needs to be addressed, as this 
will affect a new system from the materials required to the 
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design itself.  The design stage also presents the 
opportunity to consider designing for manufacturing and 
producibility.  Engineers tend to place undue emphasis 
specific product functions, but SEP should provide a 
balance that can help maintain perspective during design. 
Designing reliability into a system can be achieved 
through many paths.  Techniques such as maintaining 
simplicity of design, or the selection of particular raw 
materials all must be balanced with their possible side 
effects.  For example, if a design team chooses to optimize 
a system’s reliability through redundancy of critical 
components, they must also consider the affect on the 
logistical burden of increased part storage and 
maintenance.  There are a multitude of tools to assist in 
the analysis of reliability during design. 
Below is a non-inclusive list of reliability analysis 
tools.  Not every tool or technique applies to every 
program.  Each program, it is recommended, should tailor 
their selections to achieve their desired results. 
• Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA).  FMECA is a method to identify potential 
failure modes, causes and effects, and to rank 
them by the severity of consequences.  This tool 
can be used to eliminate or minimize potential 
problem areas or at a minimum provide maintenance 
tasks to address them. 
• Parts and Material Control Program.  Parts 
control enhances standardization and reliability.  
Controlling the quality of materials/parts used 
aides in accuracy of reliability predictions 
• Reliability Prediction.  This technique uses 
parametric estimations, historical or engineering 
models to forecast part reliabilities.  
Prediction estimates are a useful tool but should 
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only be used when it is followed with 
verification testing.  Although predicted 
estimates are never identical to fielded results, 
there are numerous examples of predicted MTBFs 
that were not even close to the actual 
performance. 
For example, the F/A-18 contains a trailing edge 
flap actuator that controls a flight control 
surface.  The original equipment manufacturer 
rated the expected MTBF at 4000 flight hours.  
The actual performance of this equipment turned 
out to be less than 400 hours.  Whether the cause 
of the error was from incorrect installation, 
unintended usage or simply from inaccurate 
predictions the results were the same.  The 
aircraft availability suffered because of the 
unplanned maintenance required and the supply 
system, which was based on the expected failure 
rate, was unprepared for the increased 
overwhelming demand. 
A hypothesis must be assumed when dealing with 
predictive reliability:  the estimate is 
incorrect until proven otherwise.  The mere 
acceptance, without proof, of a manufacturer’s 
claim is unwise at best. 
• Physics of Failure (POF).  POF is a method that 
uses modeling and simulation to identify 
mechanisms of failure prior to testing.  This 
technique can help focus future testing and 
maintenance. 
• Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HALT).  HALT is 
performed on a product as part of the design 
process.  A product is stressed beyond its 
required specifications and beyond what is 
expected in its intended environment.  This is 
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done to induce failures and identify the actual 
functional and destruct limits of a product.  
This differs from tradition verification testing 
which demonstrates a products compliance with 
specs.  HALT exposes the weakest points in the 
design in an extremely quick fashion with a 
minimum of required resources.  HALT allows early 
detection and correction of failure points that 
previously would not have been discovered prior 
to fielding. A root cause failure analysis is 
completed on each failure allowing for 
implementation of corrective actions. [Ref.16] 
• Stress Analysis.  A design technique enhanced 
with computer-aided engineering, intended to 
identify effects of stress on a system.  Through 
the computer the stress can be conducted in a 
worst-case analysis.  This analysis can help to 
reduce the region of possible failures and 
decrease the nominal stress. 
 
The importance of the design phase is demonstrated in 
Figure 5.  Nearly eighty percent of a system’s life cycle 
costs are committed in the initial stages of the design 
phase.  Decisions made on materials and processes to be 
used, will drive the rest of the program.  Mistakes or 
miscalculations made during the initial design stages will 
put the program office in a reactive position for years.   
Early orientation towards reliability may put a 
program in a proactive position.  Incorporation of built-
in-test functions and simple designs with reliable parts, 
will contribute to the ease of future maintenance 
requirements.  The inclusion of experts from multiple 
disciplines early in process will identify concerns, which 
would have been overlooked. 
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Figure 5.   Life Cycle Costs [From Ref. 37] 
 
2. Tests, Production and Verification 
A reliability program continues its iterations with 
each stage of development.  The outputs from the previous 
iteration become the inputs to the present.  As systems 
evolve reliability management must keep pace.  Testing and 
production need to continue emphasizing reliability and 
stress reduction on the system. 
The reliability targets established in the design and 
development stages must now be tested and verified.  The 
verification of accepted targets is crucial.  The 
logistical support system will be built upon the accepted 
R&M targets.  Production process must also be examined.  It 
is not uncommon for the production to introduce faults into 
the product.  Testing and process controls are the key 
elements to success at this point. 
The production process seems to be often taken for 
granted.  It is incumbent upon the program office to ensure 
that methods and material used to produce a product do 
induce reliability problems. Testing and inspection of the 
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manufacturing process must be completed to reduce 
opportunities for latent defects or human error. 
Test and evaluation (T&E) are invaluable to a 
successful program.  T&E is a part of the acquisition 
process aimed at getting the best possible product to the 
warfighter.  Some feel that testing is an unnecessary 
burden that eats into both cost and schedule.  T&E does 
consume cost; both in terms of schedule time and in 
financial commitment.  However, these expenditures serve 
two primary functions:  First, to help develop and make a 
system work; Second, to determine if a system works and 
that we are getting what we asked for.  There are 
essentially two forms of testing that accomplish these 
goals: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).  Both forms of 
testing provide feedback to acquisition decision makers. 
a. Developmental Test and Evaluation 
DT&E is a method for a PM to make his system 
work, to verify contractor claims and predictions, and to 
influence the system design.  DT&E normally aides in 
product design and development, through a test-analyze-fix-
test (TAFT) approach.  Both contractors and Governmental 
personnel can be involved in each of these four stages.  
[Ref. 22] 
The feedback provided by DT allows the systems 
engineering process to analyze the test results and devise 
required fixes or adjustments to be implemented and tested 
again.  Reliability engineers and logistician play a key 
role through the IPT process.  Ultimately design risks are 
minimized and the system can be certified ready for 
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operational testing.  Listed below are some of the testing 
techniques and tools used. 
• Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action 
System (FRACAS).  FRACAS is a closed-loop 
reporting system that plays an integral role in 
TAFT.  The formal reporting of identified issues 
allows for root cause determinations and 
corrective actions to be applied.  Early 
initiation of FRACAS provides ample time to 
address failures prior to full-rate production. 
• Environmental Stress Screening (ESS).  ESS is an 
initiative to find potential flaws through the 
use of thermal cycling and vibrations early in 
the production process enabling cost savings by 
identifying problems in the factory while there 
is time to fix. 
• Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HASS).  Hass is 
a screen test performed during the production 
process.  This test is to be completed post HALT 
and DVT.  The goal of HASS is to ensure that no 
new weak link has entered the picture during the 
production process. [Ref. 16] 
• Reliability Development Testing (RDT).  RDT or 
reliability growth testing (RGT) is the 
centerpiece of TAFT.  The reliability growth of 
the system is emphasized through an iterative 
design maturation process. 
The PM controls the DT environment and is provided 
with data, throughout this testing cycle, with which he can 
make informed managerial decisions that can affect the 
reliability of the final product.  Through developmental 
testers the PM must review contractor reliability programs, 
monitor reliability tests and review test data and reports.  
With limited resources the PM must make tough trade-off 
decisions and ultimately certify that his system is ready 
for operational test and evaluation (OPEVAL).   
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b. Operational Test and Evaluation 
OT&E is considered the conscience of the 
acquisition process.  Unlike DT, operational testing is 
accomplished by an independent agency not beholden to the 
Program Manager.  Testers are fleet representative users 
and the testing environment must be realistic of the 
intended operational environment, including anticipated 
threat countermeasures.  OT&E is designed to stress the 
system as it will be used by the warfighter.  
• Early Operational Assessments (EOA).  EOA is 
conducted prior to Milestone II/B to provide 
operational / mission input to the decision 
makers early in the life cycle.   
• Operational Assessments (OA).  Operational 
assessments begin post Milestone II/B and signify 
the start of the OTAs evaluation of system level 
performance. 
• OPEVAL.  OPEVAL is a “separate and dedicated 
phase” of OT&E conducted in support of the full-
rate production without contractor involvement.  
The purpose of OPEVAL is to evaluate a system’s 
Operational Effectiveness and Suitability.  
Reliability requirements are encompassed within 
the suitability judgment, and the OTA will 
conduct enough testing on production 
representative test articles to make that 
determination.  All supporting publications, 
logistical support planning and training will 
also be evaluated. 
• Follow-On Test and Evaluation (FOT&E).  FOT&E is 
testing completed after milestone III/C.  This 
testing is generally used to test modifications 




The purpose of OT&E can be simplified to the main 
emphasis: to see if it works.  In essence it is a final 
exam for PMs, and the last chance to influence and evaluate 
reliability before a system hits the fleet.  All 
reliability targets must have been proven within a 
confidence level acceptable to the decision authorities. 
 
3. Operations and Support 
The program office is responsible to sustain the 
reliability of their system while it remains in service. It 
is in this stage of the life cycle where the previously 
efforts to optimize reliability pay off.  PMs are required 
to “maintain a relationship with the user/warfighter based 
on system readiness.” [Ref. 14]   
The collection of field data is essential to proper 
management.  The only true measure of system performance is 
borne of that systems sustained use in actual conditions.  
Even with rigorous testing, experience has shown that 
predicted reliability estimates do not match actual system 
performance.  DoD 5000.2-R charges the PM and the logistic 
community to measure and support fielded systems, with 
emphasis on continued improvement.  
Corrective actions must be taken to address the 
differences between predicted and actual performance.  If a 
program elected to spare to the predicted reliability 
levels there may be significant delays and shortcomings 
within the available maintenance capabilities.  Adjustments 
must be made either within the system itself or within the 
supply chain. 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The reliability of a weapon system directly impacts 
upon that systems operational capability and life cycle 
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costs, making it of fundamental importance to the 
warfighter.  It is mandatory for all program managers 
within the Department of Defense to plan for and execute 
measures to ensure their program accounts for the user’s 
RAM objectives. [Ref. 14] 
This chapter provided a framework of reliability 
definitions, references, and methods.  Additionally, the 
researcher provided a view of both reliabilities’ relative 
importance in system acquisition and of opportunities 
within a systems life cycle for a PM to influence the 
reliability of the system for which he or she is 
responsible. 
Chapter III will present information about the Naval 
Air Systems Command programs surveyed for this thesis.  The 
results of the survey and interviews will be provided and 
organized by applicable themes. 
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III. PROGRAM METHODOLOGY FOR RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the methodology used and data 
gathered to address the primary and subsidiary research 
questions.  An overview of the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) and information on the system programs 
investigated are provided.  Additionally, data from these 
programs is presented in an aggregate format and summarized 
based on the responses to the electronic weapon system 
reliability management survey questionnaire.   
Data presented reflects the actions and perceptions of 




Research was conducted through a literature search of 
reliability related documents including Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Reports, General 
Accounting Office (GAO) Reports, Department of Defense 
(DoD) Official Memorandums and Directives, Congressional 
Subcommittee Reports, Military Standards and Handbooks (Mil 
Specs), and technical and professional journals, manuals 
and web sites.  Interviews were conducted with current 
acquisition professionals familiar with program and/or 
reliability management including personnel from Program 
Executive Offices (PEO), aviation program management (PMA) 
offices, contractors, the test community, user 
representative organizations, and reliability engineering 
disciplines.  Additional interviews were conducted with 
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personnel from academic disciplines, who have had years of 
experience in program and reliability management.  
Interviews were conducted in person, over the phone, or 
through electronic mail. 
All interviews, literature searches and the survey 
questionnaire were aimed at the primary research question: 
What strategies should program managers implement to 
optimize inherent reliability in their weapon system? 
 
1. Survey Questionnaire 
The Weapon System Reliability Survey Questionnaire 
used was a modified version of a previously designed survey 
intended to “draw out the practices employed by each PM 
organization on managing reliability performance risks in 
their programs.” [Ref. 39]  Electronic distribution was 
accomplished with the assistance of the Reliability and 
Maintainability Competency at NAVAIR.  Respondents to the 
questionnaire included reliability engineers, logisticians, 
operational and developmental testers, and program 
management personnel, all of whom had responsibilities 
associated with reliability within their specific program.  




Interviews were conducted as an additional method of 
addressing the research question.  Follow-up interviews 
with survey questionnaire respondents were conducted when 
amplification to their inputs was desired.  Additional 
interviews were conducted to gain insight from individuals 
who had experience and background in reliability and 
management issues.  The empirical data from interviewees 
was generally from a supervisory perspective.  Generally, 
these people consisted of PEO personnel, PMs, competency 
branch and division heads.  Interview formats focused 
primarily on the thesis research questions, which the 
interview subjects normally had time to review and respond 
in writing if desired. 
 
C. PROGRAMS STUDIED 
The systems researched were limited to Naval Aviation 
programs associated with NAVAIR.  NAVAIR is a major Naval 
Systems Command charged with systems acquisition and 
supporting those systems in the operating fleet.  Actual 
program management is a team effort.  Program Managers 
(PMs) work for a supervisory Program Executive Office (PEO) 
who in turn reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RDA)). 
The ASN (RDA) is responsible and accountable for all 
acquisition functions and programs for the Department of 
the Navy.  The PEOs and PMs are directly responsible for 
the development and acquisition of Naval systems.  As a 
Systems Command, NAVAIR provides matrix support to PMs 
including engineering, contracting, and comptroller.  
Figure 7 depicts the extensive reporting chain for NAVAIR. 
Thirteen programs spread throughout the four aviation 
PEOs and eleven Aviation Program Management (PMA) offices 
participated in the survey.  The represented systems range 
from pre-program establishment to legacy systems deployed 
and operated for over 20 years.  The programs with 
designated Acquisition Categories (ACAT) are level I and 
level II.  Perspectives covering additional programs were 
incorporated through the survey questionnaires and 
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interviews conducted with personnel in supervisory 
positions who had responsibility and knowledge of multiple 
programs.  
 
Figure 6.   NAVAIR Reporting Chain [From Ref. 30] 
 
D. DATA PRESENTATION 
In an effort to obtain disclosure of all issues 
associated with reliability management, interviewees and 
survey questionnaire respondents were permitted to provide 
information under the premise of non-attribution.  Though 
most participants did not seem concerned with attribution, 
the “political realities of system acquisition” led some 
individuals to request that they, or their program, not be 
identified.  As such, all program responses will be treated 
in the aggregate.  Participating programs and individual 
research participants will not be identified, as it would 
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be too difficult to maintain anonymity for some while 
identifying others. 
Collected data to be analyzed will be organized in the 
following themed categories: 
• Reliability Management Environment. 
• Reliability Processes and Tools. 
• Reliability of Fielded Systems. 
• Affects of Acquisition Reform. 
The following sections will present the aggregate data 
within the same areas of interest.  The data summary 
includes information from all sources of data collection.  
Where appropriate tables will be used to display 
questionnaire responses. [Ref. 39] 
 
E. RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT 
The first set of data relates to how management 
approaches the subject of reliability and seeks to identify 
the cultural environment of reliability management.  A 
series of survey questionnaire questions were intended to 
draw out the perceptions of respondents on how reliability 
is managed. 
1. Reliability Responsibility 
The results tabulated in Table 2 present the 
questionnaire answers to the following question: 
Who within your organization is primarily responsible 
for reliability activities for this particular program? 
This question was fundamental in establishing whether 
there was a consistent managerial approach.  The responses 
are presented below: 
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Chartered 
IPT? Responsible for Reliability Within PMA Total % 
Y N 
PM 1*   
Project Leader     
Systems Engineering Team Lead 1 (1*) 8% 
Logistics/Supportability Team Lead 4 31% 
Test Team Lead       
Reliability IPT 5 38% 4 1 
Prime Contractor 1 8% 
Lead Shared  2 15% 
No One Specifically       
* indicates conflicting response     
Table 2.   PMA Reliability Responsibility 
 
Response Summary: Responses varied throughout the 
programs without any unified theme.  The largest common 
response indicated that the Reliability IPT had been 
delegated primary responsibility for reliability issues.  
However, less than half of the participating programs even 
had a formal Reliability IPT.  Additionally, two program 
responses could not identify an individual or team that had 
overarching authority over reliability activities.  Instead 
they indicated that reliability management did not have a 
designated primary authority, and was purposely a shared 
responsibility through multiple sources. 
One program provided multiple responses to the 
questionnaire inclusive of the following perspectives:  
reliability engineer, subsystem IPT lead, and tester.  Each 
individual response identified a different source of 
“primary responsibility.”  The PM, Logistics/Supportability 
Team and Reliability IPT were each identified as having 
primary responsibility for reliability. 
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Additional Comments:  During an interview, one former 
PM commented that PMs manage by exception and without a 
specific problem or issue, reliability and the other 
engineering disciplines are managed through empowerment of 
the technical experts.  The common theme seemed to be an 
acknowledgement that PMs rely upon the reliability 
competency for matrixed support.  Reliability experts 
generally provide input on what reliability activities are 
suggested and where they should be implemented.  How that 
support is incorporated into a program is dependent on 
available funding and the PMs judgment based on cost, 
schedule, technical risk and political environment 
considerations. 
2. Reliability Documentation 
Most acquisition activities have an overriding program 
document that provides structure, priorities, methodology 
and/or resources for a given topic.  For example, the Test 
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is the overarching 
document relating all test activities within a program.   
How is the system reliability program and 
corresponding management approach to such formally 
documented?   
Table 3 provides the survey questionnaire responses.  
Reliability Documentation Within PMO Program Responses 
% of 
Programs 
Reliability Program Plan 9 69% 
Contract Statement of Work (SOW) 3 23% 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) 5 38% 
Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP)0  
No Formal Reliability Management Plan 1 8% 
Other 1 8% 
Table 3.   Formal Reliability Documentation 
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Response Summary:  The majority of participating Naval 
Aviation programs do indeed have an overarching reliability 
document.  Only one program, still in the earliest stages 
of development, did not yet have any formal reliability 
management plan.  In addition to a Reliability Program 
Plan, many programs track reliability activities through 
the TEMP or Statement of Work (SOW). 
3. Reliability Resources 
Allocation of available resources is inherently a 
management function.  As such, participating PMA 
representatives were asked to assess the adequacy of 
reliability resources.  Table 4 provides the responses to 
the following question:   
Is the amount of time and funding allotted for 
reliability testing sufficient for your program? 
 
ADEQUACY OF RELIABILITY RESOURCES 
Current Schedule and 
Available Funds are 
Sufficient 






Effort at This 
Time 
4 6 3 
31% 46% 23% 
Table 4.   Adequacy of Reliability Resources 
 
Response Summary:  The PMAs that responded that their 
program had sufficient funding fit into two categories; 1) 
High visibility programs early in the development stage 
enjoying positive support and funding or, 2) Legacy 
programs enjoying considerable support in part due to their 
current tactical usage. 
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The PMAs that responded that they currently were not 
engaged in significant reliability efforts were either 
early in the defining requirement stage or have just 
successfully entered fielding after making required 
adjustments to production articles.  The remaining programs 
fit the more common profile of a program competing for 
funding and undergoing the scrutiny that is a part of the 
acquisition process.  Knowing that resources are limited, 
tough decisions often lead to compromise on schedules and 
priorities effecting system reliability.  
Additional Comments:  One Reliability IPT member 
stated that reliability, maintainability and supportability 
are always the elements that are compromised when executing 
a program.  He further commented that these activities are 
so essential that they need to be fully funded and not have 
their schedules so compressed that testing is either 
severely cut or meaningless. 
An interviewed PM said that program management often 
operates in the gray area, and that we knowingly “mortgage 
the O&M future” to gain production support today.  A 
reliability IPT team leader provided the following 
discussion on reliability funding: 
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Reliability costs are largely up front in the 
design and testing phases and can be rather 
significant….  When we come to testing and 
fielding and we find shortfalls in the system 
reliability.  Normally the cost to make any 
reliabilty improvemnts comes from the same pot 
[of money] as system performance improvements, 
which usually win out over reliability.  The 
programs need to have a contingency fund for 
reliability and maintainability fixes.  Early in 
the program when there are few units in the field 
this would have a very good chance of providing a 
quick payback in logisics savings. 
 
The general consensus of comments can be summed up 
with the following quote: 
We will either pay for it up-front or the fleet 
will pay for it in terms of reliability or 
maintainability once it gets fielded in the 
fleet. 
4. Reliability Regulations and Policies 
Regulatory documentation is a reflection of the 
attention paid to a subject by higher headquarters. 
Are you aware of any specific DoD or Navy policy 
regulation regarding weapon system reliability management? 





Responses %  
YES 4 31% 
NO 4 31% 
NOT SURE 5 38% 
Table 5.   Reliability Policies and Regulations 
 
Response Summary: 
Programs that replied yes identified the DoD 5000.2-R, 
specific program documentation, or the cancelled military 
specifications and standards.  Nine out of 13 programs, and 
12 out of 18 questionnaire responses, stated that they were 
unaware or unsure of any policy or regulation regarding 
reliability management.  Most responses and interviews 
further commented on frustration with a lack of useful 
documented guidance. 
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Additional Paraphrased Comments:  The following 
comments are paraphrased responses: 
• DoD 5000.2 and not much more; with acquisition 
reform the Government backed off military specs 
and standards. 
• There has been a reduction in the design 
fundamentals [MIL-STD/HNDBK] throughout the 90’s. 
• Some PMAs were told to shift to commercial best 
practices, unfortunately the contractor does not 
always know better. 
• Reliability engineers continue to use the 
cancelled military specs and handbooks because 
there has been nothing to replace them. 
• Some reliability engineers just cut portions of 
MIL-STD-785/781 and paste them into the Statement 
of Work (SOW). 
• At program initiation the Willoughby reliability 
improvement initiatives were included in the 
specification. 
• “If you identify some, please let me know.” 
 
F. RELIABILITY TOOLS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCESSES 
This section provides information on the methods and 
strategies used to implement reliability management.  Data 
pertaining to the use of contractual incentives will be 
discussed along with the issues of influencing 
requirements, designing-in reliability, and test and 
evaluation. 
1. Requirements Generation 
Requirement generation is the genesis of every 
acquisition program.  The data presented here was gathered 
to address the PM’s ability to influence system 
requirements, with respect to reliability, during their 
initial formation.  Programs were asked: 
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Were you as the material developer able to influence 
the incorporation of realistic reliability requirements as 
part of the ORD process? 








Responses %  
YES 9 69% 
NO 2 15% 
Other 1 8% 
Table 6.   PMs Influence on Requirement Generation 
 
Additionally PMAs were asked whether reliability was 
identified as a key performance parameter (KPP).  Because 
KPPs are those requirements or capabilities that are deemed 
to be so critical that failure to reach the threshold level 
may result in the programs termination, the researcher 
wanted to determine if reliability issues reached this 
level of scrutiny.  Only four programs answered in the 
affirmative, with others replying that although not a KPP, 
reliability ranks within the highest tier of priority. 
Response Summary:  Overwhelmingly the programs 
participated in the derivation of requirements to be 
included in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD).  
The “no” votes reflect legacy programs in which a sister 
service acts as the executive agent and whose original 
requirements document cannot be located.  The “other” vote 
is from a support equipment program that gets its 
requirements through the systems it supports. 
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However, there was not unanimity in support of the 
requirement process.  One team leader felt that the 
original user requirements were altered not because of 
technical necessity but to merely to satisfy the desired 
contractor’s estimates.  The natural course of compromise 
that occurs in requirements generation is hard to quantify 
in terms of severity, because the consequences are not 
realized until some point in the future. 
Supporting Comments:  The following comments are 
paraphrased from survey questionnaire responses and 
interviews. 
• Initial values were solicited from operational 
users and requirement ‘gate keepers,’ but were 
modified to meet potential contractor estimates 
based on financial incentives and contract award 
fees. 
• User requirements are sometimes in need of a 
reality check.  The reliability engineering 
realities do not support the uninformed user. 
• If reliability experts are not integrated into 
the IPTs until after the ORD and contracts are 
developed, it will take years to correct. 
• R&M is not a KPP, but is much on the minds of the 
PMA in relation to passing OPEVAL. 
2. Design for Reliability 
An ideal time to consider reliability of a system is 
while there are still opportunities to influence the 
outcome.  Given a set of agreed upon requirements, programs 
must then translate those requirements into a functioning 
system.  With that in mind, the survey questionnaire 
participants were asked: 
What contractual design tools were/are employed to 
ensure reliability is “built in” early on in the program? 
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Table 7 depicts the program responses. 
 
Types of Design Tools 
Used to "Design-in" 




Physics of Failure (PoF) 2 15% 
Critical Items 
List/Analysis 6 46% 
Identification of Known 
Problem Areas 9 69% 
Software Reliability 
Assessment 7 54% 
Quality Function 
Deployment  1 8%  
Parts Control Program 8 62% 
FMECA /FRACAS /FTA 12 92% 
Reliability Prediction 
Analysis 4 31% 
Table 7.   Reliability Design Tools 
 
Response Summary:  All PMAs reported using design 
tools to address reliability within their system.  100 
percent of the programs use some form of failure analysis 
as an integral part of design.  There was a clear consensus 
that employment of tools that incorporate reliability 
considerations into system design was required. 
Additional Paraphrased Comments:  The following 
paraphrased comments reflect the survey questionnaire 
responses describing additional tools: 
• Specification Allocation –the [MTBF] requirement 
was allocated to each element of the weapon 
system. 
• Design to Allocation – required the minimum 
design to allocation to be at least 25% above the 
specification allocation to ensure confidence in 
achieving specified requirements. 
• Design and Fleet Field predictions were used. 
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• Stress analysis and stress derating were also 
done. 
• Implemented prediction that directly correlates 
to other program goals and have driven contractor 
to that prediction. 
• As reliability engineers we list all of tools 
that we think will be useful, knowing that PMs 
will cut many of them citing fiscal restraints. 
3. Contracting for Reliability 
Contracts and contractual incentives are often used as 
motivation tools or strategies attempting to focus a 
contractor’s effort.  Contracts produce a similar effect on 
the Government’s side by concentrating attention on 
particular components of a given acquisition program.  
Several question posed in the survey questionnaire were 
aimed at determining how reliability requirements are 
interpreted into a contract. 
The first contract related question: 
Was reliability included as a factor in source 
selection? 
Table 8 depicts the survey responses. 
RELIABILITY AS A FACTOR IN 
SOURCE SELECTION 
YES NO UNK 
6 4 3 
46% 31% 23% 
Table 8.   Reliability in Source Selection 
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Response Summary:  Half of the programs confirmed the 
use of reliability measures during source selection.  These 
programs generally represented ACAT I high dollar programs 
with large defense contractors.  In general most 
respondents felt that issues like FMECA, FRACAS, and 
predictions were discussed even if not formal source 
selection criteria. 
The second contract related question inquired about 
the translation of operational requirements to contractual 
requirements.  Table 9 provides the answers to the 
following question: 
How are ORD reliability requirements for your program 
translated into actual contractual reliability 
requirements? 
 
TRANSLATION OF ORD RELIABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS TO CONTRACTUAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
ORD Requirement  Restated 
in SOW 6 
Additional Levels  
Applied to Contract 4 
Reliability Not 
Adequately Addressed 1 
Other 
1 
Table 9.   Reliability Requirements in the Contract 
 
Response Summary:  All of the programs that have 
established contracts stated that at a minimum the ORD 
requirements were restated in the SOW.  There was one 
dissenting comment that pertained to degradation of 
operational requirements being nipped at in small 




Additional Paraphrased Comments: 
• As part of the IPT process the contractor was 
tasked with developing a R&M design program that 
would reduce risk and demonstrate the ORD 
requirements. 
• The R&M audit trail process dictates the process.  
ORD values are translated into Design 
Controllable numbers, with confidence bands and 
safety margins applied to go from ORD to TEMP to 
SPEC. 
• Design controllable reliability requirement added 
to spec / ORD had value that included induced 
failures. 
• The primary metric for assessing operating 
reliability of the [system] is the Captive Carry 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF).  The [system] 
reliability is heavily dependant on the host 
aircraft upon which it is being employed and the 
corresponding environment in which the aircraft 
is flown. 
• [System] variants have been deployed for a number 
of years in the USN/USAF inventory and captive 
carry MTBF has been determined to be the best 
reliability metric based on its use history.  
Therefore, a single MTBF number was detailed in 
the SOW/performance specification, which was 
provided to the contractor. 
• New programs are putting the [reliability] issues 
in the contract as a means of enforcement. 
 
Lastly, PMAs were asked: 
Are there incentives employed in the contract that are 
specifically tied to achieving system reliability 
performance requirements? 
Their responses are summarized in table 10. 
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If Yes, Did The 
Incentives Achieve 









Too Early to Tell 
Yes 5   5 
No   7     
Table 10.   Reliability Contractual Incentives 
 
Response Summary:  With less than half of the programs 
indicating that they have incorporated incentives in the 
contract, there was a mixed response to this question.  
Some programs responded that reliability goals were 
achieved through IPT style supervision, rather than actual 
contractual incentives.  None of the programs that have 
established reliability incentives have yet had an 
opportunity to evaluate effectiveness. 
Additional Comments:  One technical team lead, with an 
operational background, indicated that the incentives on 
his program were unfortunately misguided.  He felt that the 
incentives shifted the focus from operational pertinent 
reliability requirements to ones based on contractor 
estimates of “achievable standards’ not reflective of 
original agreed upon requirements.  Additionally he stated: 
We’re 100% over budget and not meeting the early 
DT testing conditions.  Fundamental shortfalls 
programmatically in design, systems engineering 
and simulation have produced an immature design 
held to financial constraints. 
From the same program another respondent reported that 
during the design phase R&M was an Award Fee consideration, 
but was outranked by cost and schedule impacts.  During 
testing reliability is being measured against its 
contractual requirements. 
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4. Reliability Test and Evaluation Activities 
Test and evaluation (T&E) is an integral part of every 
program.  T&E is undertaken both to aid in the development 
of a system and to verify that a given product meets the 
standards as stated by the customer.  This data section was 
derived from a series of questions that addressed 
reliability growth programs, common understanding of 
reliability terms among parties, test activities, and 
reliability entrance criteria. 
a. Reliability Growth Program 
Most programs incorporate a Test-Analyze-Test-Fix 
(TAFT) approach to product development.  An essential 
reliability component of TAFT is the reliability 
development or growth plan (RDP/RGP).  Survey questionnaire 
respondents were asked whether their program had 
incorporated a RGT.  Table 11 depicts the responses to the 
following question:  













Y N Did Not Have 
Yet 
Yes 7 54   2 3 
No   6 46 1   4 
N/A 1 8 1     
Table 11.   Incorporation of Reliability Growth Program 
 
Response Summary:  Most of the participating programs 
have an established reliability growth program.  The “not 
applicable” response was from an acquisition program to 
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early in its life cycle to have yet established a RGP.  
Overall the response was mixed between the PMAs with formal 
growth programs and the PMAs who claim to achieve 
associated reliability growth in the natural course of 
development.   
Additional Paraphrased Comments:  The following 
comments are paraphrased from interview and survey 
respondents: 
• Both the Statement of Work and the contractor’s 
Reliability Development Growth Program Plan 
outline our reliability growth tests. 
• In the design specification in the form of a 
reliability requirement to be demonstrated in a 
Technical Evaluation period at the end of the EMD 
testing prior to OPEVAL. 
• No reliability growth programs although technical 
directives are issued to correct known 
deficiencies. 
• Weapon systems have to grow into it 
[reliability]. 
• PMs may need to add developmental tests to 
achieve the required level of confidence. 
 
b. Common Terms and Methods for Measuring 
Reliability 
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Common understanding of terms is fundamental to a 
mutual understanding of reliability test results.  This is 
an issue when comparing different weapon systems (e.g. F/A-
18 vs. JSF), a lack of agreement amongst cooperative 
partners within a program can be paralyzing.  Additionally, 
there is a difference between how the operator/user views 
and measures reliability, and how reliability is measured 
during developmental testing within the same program.  Each 
of the PMAs was asked: 
Have the user, tester, contractor and PMO all 
agreed upon the method (model) to be used in reliability 
calculations? 
Table 12 depicts the results. 
 
Have the PM, User, 
Contractor, and Tester 
Agreed Upon the Method to 
be used for Measuring 
Reliability ? 
Program 
Responses %  
Yes 9 69% 
No  1 8% 
Not Sure 3 23% 
Table 12.   Common Agreement on Reliability Methods 
 
Response Summary: 
Most of the responding PMAs acknowledged a positive 
effort to reach a common understanding.  The sole “no 
response” was from the program that has not yet established 
their methods or terms.  The “not sure” responses 
correspond to respondents who stated that they were not 
familiar with this particular issue because the test phase 
occurred years before they became involved in the program. 
Additional Paraphrased Comments: 
• ORD, SPEC and TEMP have standardized R&M formulas 
and definitions. 
• The contract requirement deals with design 
controllable or inherent failures.  To provide 
the fleet perspective the test data collected and 
scored using specific criteria, the results could 
be presented as to how the system is performing 
in terms of contract requirement and 
simultaneously present the expected fleet 
performance. 
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• The Joint Reliability and Maintainability 
Evaluation Team and Test Data Scoring Board 
(JRMET/TDSB) charter documents the methods to be 
used. 
• Captive Carry MTBF is specified in the contract. 
• The NAVAIR model was agreed to and its use is 
stated in our reliability attachment. 
c. Reliability Test Activities 
Reliability testing can take many forms and the 
wide selection of possible techniques allows for tailoring 
a test program to fit a given program.  The following 
question was aimed to determine which test activities PMAs 
use. 
Identify the types of test activities that have 
or will be used to determine compliance as part of your 
system’s reliability program. 
Types of Test Activities PMs Use to 
Determine Reliability Performance 
Progress & Compliance 
Program 
Responses % 
Environmental Testing/Stress Screening 11 85% 
Accelerated Testing (e.g. HALT) 7 54% 
Reliability Development Growth Test 
(RDGT) 6 46% 
Reliability Qualification/ 
Demonstration Test (RQ/DT) 5 38% 
Government Development Test (DT) 7 54% 
Operational Testing (e.g. LUT/ 
OPTEMPO/IOTE/FOTE 10 77% 
Acceptance Test/Production 
Verification Test     
Maintenance Demonstration     
Table 13.   Reliability Test Activities 
 
Response Summary: 
Programs overwhelmingly address reliability through 
environmental screening and operational testing.  
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Additionally some programs reported the use of software 
functional testing and stockpile reliability 
testing/sampling.   
d. Reliability Entrance Criteria for OPEVAL 
OPEVAL is the final exam for programs just prior 
to the decision on whether the system will go on to full-
rate production.  Given the importance of OPEVAL, and the 
history of programs having significant shortfalls in 
reliability during this phase of testing, each of the PMAs 
were asked about their approach to addressing this 
situation. [Ref.2 DOT&E, 00]  Table 14 summarizes the PMA 
responses to the following question: 
Does (or did) your program have specific OPEVAL 
entrance criteria relative to reliability? 
 





Responses %  
Yes 4 31% 
No  5 38% 
Not Sure 4 31% 
Table 14.   Reliability Entrance Criteria 
Response Summary: 
Surprisingly, only one-third of the programs surveyed 
have established dedicated reliability entrance criteria to 
OPEVAL.  Some of these programs have even identified 
entrance criteria for the earlier phase of operational 
assessment (OA).  For example, OA entrance criteria were 
25% of the OPEVAL requirement allowing for immaturity of a 
system in its early stage of development.   
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e. Early Test Results versus OPEVAL 
Testing within a program occurs on a continuum 
beginning with early contractor testing and progressing 
through OPEVAL into follow-on test and evaluation.  The 
purpose of development testing is to help mature a system 
and to verify that the product does indeed meet technical 
expectations.  OPEVAL is focused on the operational 
effectiveness and operational suitability, and is conducted 
outside of the restrictive bounds of the DT environment.  
The PMAs were asked if the early testing related to success 
in OPEVAL. 
If your system has already participated in 
OPEVAL, did your success in either DT or other reliability-
testing correlate with success in OPEVAL? 
Table 15 relates the program responses to OPEVAL, 
as well as emerging DT/OT results. 
   




   Correlation of Early 
Reliability Test Results with 
OPEVAL Results? 
Program 
Response %  
Initial 
DT    
Results   
Initial 
OT   
Results
 100%   100% Yes, success in pre-OPEVAL reliability testing led to 
requirements being fully met 
in initial IOTE. 
3 23% 
 4   4 
 80%   80% Not completely, system did well in early testing but had 
some problems in OPEVAL 2 15%  1   1 
 60%   60% Not at first, system passed OPEVAL after X attempts.     
 1     
 < 40%   < 40% N/A, system either not yet involved in an operational 
test or the early testing did 
not assess reliability.   
8 62% 
 1     




The majority of the responding programs had not yet 
undergone the scrutiny of OPEVAL.  Those programs that had 
experienced OPEVAL were evenly split on their responses.  
Reliability success in pre-OPEVAL testing does not assure 
success in OPEVAL itself.  Programmatic success relates to 
how the PMA used the information gained from the testing 
undertaken, and under what conditions or environment the 
system was tested. 
Additional Paraphrased Comments:  Several respondents 
included illustrative examples from their programs.  Here 
are some paraphrased examples: 
 
• Some had a combined DT/OT test (OT-IIA), which 
used EDM configuration hardware with encouraging 
results. 
• In general systems that completed qualification, 
reliability, and flight tests then had corrective 
actions installed and retested did well in 
OPEVAL.  In a number of cases, systems underwent 
process changes or had improvements incorporated 
but were not flight-tested and experienced a lot 
of problems in OPEVAL due to infant mortality and 
bad process control. 
• TAFT was painful, but it seemed to work.  We 
instituted a corrective action board that tracked 
identified problems and approved solutions and 
determined the degree of retesting required. 
• The primary lesson learned on [system] was that a 
tactically operationally representative test 
program where the test article can be tested in 
the full-up configuration on the aircraft and 
functionally tested almost real-time is the most 
effective method for assessing inherent 




G. RELIABILITY OF FIELDED SYSTEMS 
Programs that have properly planned and executed 
effective reliability management plans may reap benefits 
once a system reaches the hands of the war fighting 
operators.  History has shown that in practice, however, 
that the PMA’s reliability work is not yet complete.  The 
DoD 5000.2-R specifically charges PMs and the logistics 
community with supporting fielded systems. [Ref. 14] 
This section seeks to provide information on how this 
support mission is accomplished.  Only two of the thirteen 
programs participating in the survey questionnaire had 
reached the fleet fielding stage.  The response summary 
combines those program responses with information received 
for additional interview subjects and respondents who 













RELIABILITY OF FIELDED SYSTEMS 
  YES   NO
  # %   # %
Conditional Materiel Release (CMR)         
Was the system initially fielded with a CMR due to 
reliability shortfalls?        3  
Is the CMR still in effect?         
N/A         
Collection of Field Reliability Data         
Reliability information is obtained from Depot, Contractor 
Logistics Support (CLS) records, or other means (e.g. 
Production Quality Deficiency Reports PQDRs) 4       
Warranty collection data provides information on reliability 
performance         
A formal collection system does not exist         
Status of Reliability in the Field         
System performance meets/exceeds ORD requirement 
3       
System performance is less than ORD requirement 
        
Do not know (due to lack of data, or too early)         
Cost Effective Reliability Improvements         
Has collection of reliability failure data in the field led 
to any cost effective improvements?       3  
Too early in program to tell         
Reliability Improvement Program         
Is there a formal reliability improvement program? 
2    3  
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)         
Is there a formal RCM program? 4     1  
Table 16.   Reliability of Fielded Systems 
 
Response Summary:  Fielded systems often are seen as 
the benchmark of success, but the hard work has just begun.  
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Ideally, the processes used to assess and enhance system 
reliability throughout the acquisition cycle will pay off.  
Compromises along the way however, have invariably taken a 
toll on the optimization of reliability. 
Experience seems to have demonstrated that the 
reliability activities used in the design, development and 
production of a system have been geared to meet a 
specification requirement that may not reflect the actual 
operators use of the system.  Programs sometimes complain 
that the user does not operate a system as it was designed, 
while operators retort that the system was not designed to 
be operated in the manner they require. 
Disconnects between the program office and the 
warfighter seem to be traced to communication failures.  
Either, there is an actual problem with the weapon system, 
or with its associated training plan.  Both of these items 
fall within the purview and responsibilities of the PM. 
There is little consistency between the programs.  
Some systems state reliability in different ways.  Here are 
three weapon system examples: 1) The weapons will be at 
least XX% reliable when removed from its container at any 
time during its life; 2) The weapons will be least XX% 
reliable when removed from it container after five years in 
storage or 3) Weapons must be at least XX% reliable when 
tested after three years and may degrade no more the Y% for 
each additional year.  Other systems state the requirement 
in terms of Storage MTBF, Captive Carry MTBF or both. 
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The collection of field data is a crucial element in 
reliability support.  Aircraft systems generally provide 
maintenance information through automated information 
systems.  Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management 
Information System (NALCOMIS) collects and provides 
automation for organizational and intermediate level 
maintenance activities.  NALCOMIS is generally used as a 
day-to-day management tool and holds maintenance related 
information including historical logs and records. [Ref. 
29] 
The need for improved data analysis, resulting from 
the growth in sophistication and complexity of weapon 
systems, has led to the development of the Naval Aviation 
Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA) System. [Ref. 36]  However, 
reliability practitioners feel that this system provides a 
wealth of data but does not directly correlate to 
reliability uses.  NAVAIR does have at least three 
activities, in varying stages of implementation, focused on 
in-service management that incorporates reliability.  The 
three activities are Reliability Centered Maintenance 
(RCM), Sustained Maintenance Planning (SMP), and 
Reliability Improvement Teams located at the depots. 
RCM is an analytical process used to determine 
preventive maintenance (PM) requirements.  Used as a tactic, 
RCM is a strategy that is function oriented seeking to 
preserve system functions through maintenance at failure, 
preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance and 
detective maintenance.  The basic fundamental of RCM is the 
root cause analysis of why a failure occurred.  The root 
cause needs to be determined so that an appropriate 
solution can be invoked. [Ref. 21] 
SMP and RIT both stem from the Business Process Review 
(BPR) initiative.  SMP aims not only at identifying 
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problems but also attempts to examine proactive 
opportunities to infuse new technologies, obsolescence 
avoidance, and maintenance improvements encompassing 
additional perspectives beyond reliability.  SMP 
implementation has been program specific vice a centralized 
NAVAIR process. 
The reliability improvement teams look to improve 
component reliability and lower life cycle costs through 
the identification of high cost and/or low reliability 
items.  Once the components are identified, processes and 
results from maintenance and repair are studied to identify 
improvements.  The intent is to complete a full loop from 
problem identification, fix implementation, through 
solution verification.  Their reliability analysis model is 
currently in its initial phase with a low-tech approach.  
Figure 8 depicts the three-phased development of the 
program.   
Supporting Comments:   
• TAFT was painful, but success was in the 
fielding. 
• Most systems do employ RCM, but "hands-on" data 
collection and scrubbing is very inefficient and 
labor intensive. 
• No extensive reliability data collection system 
available.  No S/N tie to failure data for O/I/D 
level life cycle tracking - NEED ONE !  We're 
"data rich - info poor".   
• Need to identify reliability data collection 
goals (time on wing, rework requirements, MP 
support, RCM/PM reqts, etc.) and develop the data 
collection system to support those goals. 
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• While real time supply support is certainly a 
plus, have concerns with TLS contracts in regards 
to prime "preaching" reliability improvements, 
stating irrelevant metrics, and not producing 
improvements. 
• RCM for weapons is still a work in progress.  
Weapons reliability is driven by electronics 
random failure; this failure mechanism is not 
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Figure 7.   Business Process Review Reliability Analysis Model 
[From Ref.4]  
 
H. AFFECTS OF ACQUISITION REFORM 
Acquisition reform is a leadership-sponsored movement 
throughout the Department of Defense endeavoring to make 
the acquisition process more effective, efficient and 
productive.  The reform initiative is intended to 
streamline requirements and reduce the system’s cycle time.  
Moves toward the use of commercial practices and private 
enterprise are hallmarks of Acquisition reform. 
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On June 29, 1994, Department of Defense Secretary 
William Perry mandated the use of acquisition reform 
throughout DoD with the issuance of his memorandum 
entitled, "Specifications and Standards--A New Way of Doing 
Business."  The implementation of streamlining measures and 
personnel reductions had effects throughout the acquisition 
community.  The researcher sought to determine the 
perceived effects of reform on the engineering discipline 
of reliability and its management. [Ref. 23} 
 
Survey questionnaire participants were asked: 
In your opinion, has acquisition streamlining (e.g. 
performance specifications, use of COTS, etc…) and/or the 
continued trend of government downsizing contributed either 
directly or indirectly towards reliability shortfalls 
experienced by programs? 
Additionally, two follow-up questions are included in 
Table 17 and the response summary below; 
a) If COTS/NDI components were/are utilized in the 
design of your system, did the COTS components realize the 
reliability performance claims of the OEM?  b) Given the 
realities of streamlining and downsizing, do you believe 
the Navy reliability community has adequately compensated 






In your opinion, has the move towards performance-based 
specifications, the increased use of COTS, and/or the 
continued trend of Government downsizing had any 
negative effects on reliability of systems?   Program Responses 
% of 
Programs
Yes, due to performance based specifications. 4 31% 
Yes, due to downsizing the workforce.   . 
Yes, due to both acquisition streamlining and downsizing 5 38% 
No 2 15% 
No comment 4 31% 
COTS/NDI components do not live up to OEM claims 3 23% 
Table 17.   Effects of Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
 
Response Summary: 
Respondents and interviewees generally expressed 
concern that although acquisition reform has benefited some 
areas, reliability practices and reliability management 
have specifically been hampered.  The combination of a 
reduction in the reliability workforce and increased use of 
commercial of the shelf (COTS) items continually were 
highlighted as problem areas. 
The reliability workforce has declined while the 
increased use of commercial items and performance 
specifications actually has increased the total workload.  
COTS usage has proven to be more work than it appears 
because COTS equipment has not been designed to operate in 
the warfighters environment. 
 
Additional Paraphrased Comments: 
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• The perception by program offices is that all you 
have to do with COTS is install it—no need to 
test. 
• COTS has major limitations and upper management 
does not understand this or even want to discuss 
it. 
• Programs have found that on COTS where they did 
HALT testing, they improved the system and expect 
it these systems to work in our environment.  
• PMs need to determine if COTS items will survive 
in your operating environment. 
• Contractors have stated that are going to 
commercial components and that we have to change 
our environmental requirements, as their systems 
will no longer meet the existing standards. 
• When some PMAs receive a request to use COTS or 
commercial components in a design, they require 
HALT. 
• Some programs use COTS but always have to harden 
them to work in our environs—so are they still 
COTS? 
• The reduced use of specs and standards has 
hampered our effectiveness. 
• Streamlining means the use of COTS, less people 
to track R&M, less people to follow up and fix 
issues.  
• Reliability personnel cuts led to the current 
method of monitoring results from the Fleet, 
which is too long to provide any meaningful 
feedback to the manufacturer to help in 
reliability growth.  Systems are out of warranty 
before they are evaluated for reliability.. 
• Ignorance is not an acceptable solution to 
inadequately funded/resourced effort.  Additional 




Paraphrased Respondent Suggestions:  Survey 
questionnaire respondents were asked if they had 
suggestions for improvement to acquisition reform.  
Selected comments are listed below: 
• Mandate the use of life-cycle-costs as the basis 
for all design trade-offs.  Currently the unit 
production cost is used, therefore reliability 
and life-cycle-costs are always sacrificed to 
produce a lower unit cost.  The unit cost is 
generally the metric which determines the success 
of the program for the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA). 
• Need to standardize modeling tools used within 
NAVAIR. 
• Working with USAF; their standardization of 
processes are documented better. 
• Do not use COTS.  Use what is best to meet 
reliability goals of the program. 
• Streamlining and downsizing, to be effective, 
requires all parties to assume greater 
responsibility.  In practice we have spread so 
thin and not held anyone accountable.  We need to 
empower (and reward) people to accept the 
additional responsibility that has been thrust 
upon them. 
• Fund and resource to adequate levels. 
• R&M and supportability are always compromised 
when executing programs.  These activities need 
to be funded and their schedules need to be 
shielded from compression that would make them 
meaningless.  We will pay up-front or the fleet 
WILL pay once it gets fielded. 
 
All surveyed programs were asked to identify which 
reliability related commercial practices were employed in 






What Types of Commercial Reliability 




Physics of Failure (PoF) 3 23% 
Predictive Models  3 23% 
Prognostics/Life Consumption 
Monitoring 2 15% 
Identification and Mitigation of 
Failure Modes (FMECA) 6 46% 
Accelerated Life Testing (e.g. HALT) 4 31% 
Reliability Growth Testing 2 15% 
Reliability-Driven Parts 
Selection/Control  3 23% 
Other 3 23% 
Do Not Employ any Commercial Practices 3 23% 
Table 18.   Commercial Reliability Practices 
 
Response Summary: 
Commercial practices are widely used in Naval aviation 
programs.  Programs tailor the practices employed to fit 
their reliability goals and more importantly their budget. 
Additional Paraphrased Comments: 
• Need to benchmark some commercial systems 
(believe Northwest has an efficient data 
collection/analysis system). 
• Our practices are reactive programatics, not a 
deliberate effort to effectively mitigate risks. 
 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
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This chapter presented the methodology used and the 
data gathered relating to the task of reliability 
management.  Acquisition workforce professionals directly 
contributed through participation in either interviews 
and/or completion of a survey styled questionnaire.  The 
information provided reflects the experience and 
perceptions of the experts who know the issues involved 
with reliability management.  The data was organized in 
four categories: 1) Reliability Management Environment; 2) 
Reliability Processes and Tools; 3) Reliability of Fielded 
Systems; and 4) Affects of Acquisition Reform. 
Chapter IV provides an organized analysis of the data 
presented in this chapter, focusing on the methods 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the results of research and the 
data presented in Chapters II and III.  The focus of 
analysis is on the primary thesis question: 
“What strategies should Program Managers implement to 
optimize reliability in their weapon system?” 
The qualitative analysis presented will follow the 
format of the data presented in the previous chapter, 
including the following four themed categories:  1) 
Reliability Management Environment; 2) Reliability Tools, 
Techniques and Processes; 3) Reliability of Fielded 
Systems; 4) Affects of Acquisition Reform. 
 
B. RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT 
1. Reliability Responsibility 
The Program Manager is ultimately responsible for 
reliability, and the reliability results achieved will 
reflect the PMs attention to the issue.  Tailoring may 
account for some differences between programs but if 
individuals within the same program cannot identify the 
body responsible for reliability management there is a 
significant lack of leadership attention to the subject.   
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Although it may seem logical that an IPT created to 
deal with program reliability issues would have primary 
responsibility of its management, it also can be perceived 
as a stovepipe or constricting process.  The programs that 
assigned the reliability members to each design team claim 
to have done so with purpose.  Through the dissemination of 
reliability expertise these programs aim to catch 
problematic issues before they are instituted.  This 
forward thinking approach displays an attitude toward 
reliability that shifts its management from supervisory to 
participatory. 
Even with logistical and reliability personnel 
disseminated throughout a program there should still be a 
recognizable champion for reliability issues.  On programs 
where there is not a consistent designated reliability 
authority there may be a lack of focus to the subject. 
2. Reliability Documentation 
The data shows that documenting reliability on a 
program level is accomplished most often through the use of 
a dedicated Reliability Program Plan (RPP).  Although 
programs have developed a document detailing the activities 
and responsibilities surrounding the management of 
reliability, it should be noted that none of the programs 
provided their RPP to the researcher.  Therefore a thorough 
analysis of the contents of these plans was not possible.  
Review of these documents is warranted and is listed in 
Chapter V as an area for further research.  It is critical 
that PMAs have reliability criteria that is clear and can 
be rigorously enforced. 
3. Reliability Resources 
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Acquisition management is accomplished in a fiscal 
reality where resources are limited and true costs are not 
articulated.  As such, any analysis done must appreciate 
the gray area of the political arena in which PMs operate.  
It is not that limited resources applied to reliability 
cannot be explained or appreciated, but the acquisition 
community and its leadership must knowingly acknowledge 
that money not spent on reliability optimization during 
development will be spent many times over during operations 
and support.   
This fiscal death spiral is where the services 
currently find themselves attempting to maintain a legacy 
system laden defense force.  Although current budgeting 
events surrounding the War on Terrorism are likely to yield 
positive increases in recapitalization funding, if those 
recapitalization efforts do not reflect reliability 
improvement measures there will have been no learning from 
the fleets present condition and existing systems will 
continue their downward slide. 
The competition for funding that pits reliability 
improvements against performance enhancements is 
foreboding.  Often the system performance improvements are 
made not only at the expense of possible reliability 
enhancements, but actually further degrade the existing 
reliability.  The lack of emphasis on reliability resources 
is counterproductive to any life cycle concern. 
4. Reliability Regulations and Policies 
The current state of regulatory documents and policies 
seems insufficient for use as constructive managerial 
tools.  Although the advent of the Spec and Standards 
Reform does allow great latitude for PMs to tailor and 
apply commercial standards to suit their needs, the 
commercial standards for reliability do not reflect the 
reliability needs of DoD.  In practice, programs continue 
to use the cancelled specs and standards through a cut and 
paste mentality placing the MIL-SPEC information in the 
Statement of Work. 
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Some might contend that this approach is perfectly 
aligned with the reform movement, which allows the use of 
Government standards where required.  However, the 
Government reliability standards are no longer reviewed or 
maintained on a regular basis.  Despite the efforts of the 
Reliability Research Center no commercial standard exists 
for reliability engineering or management. 
The pending rewrite of the SECNAVINST 5000.2C has 
reliability specific guidance that should be a useful aid 
to PMs.  A consistent recognition of, and focus upon, the 
importance of reliability management will greatly benefit 
the life cycle cost burden under which our current systems 
suffer.  The acquisition workforce personnel responsible 
for reliability, including the logisticians, engineers and 
testers, require enforceable criteria and clearly 
delineated reliability management fundamental procedures. 
 
C. RELIABILITY TOOLS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCESSES 
1. Requirements Generation 
The data shows that PMAs are involved in the 
reliability requirement generation in most cases.  PMA 
involvement implies an opportunity for PMs to have a 
positive influence on the incorporation of realistic 
reliability requirements.  The extent to which this 
positive influence is effective is reflective of 
reliability and logistical experts level of involvement and 
their understanding of the criticality of reliability.  
It is essential that the logisticians and reliability 
personnel be involved in this early stage of the program 
development.  The issue of reliability truly should be 
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multi-disciplinary and cannot be relegated to the 
engineering disciplines.  Reliability is a fundamental 
component of a systems development and requires input from 
all sources.  A reliability oversight during requirements 
generation can take years to fix and is difficult to 
incorporate into an existing program. 
2. Design for Reliability 
Design emphasis must reflect the required reliability 
and robustness required by the warfighter’s operational 
environment.  The PM, using the Systems Engineering Process 
with strong input from logistics management, is responsible 
for taking validated user requirements and turning them 
into design criteria.  A balance must be struck between 
cost, schedule, performance, risk and life cycle needs.  
Reliability certainly falls within this purview. 
It is up to the PMA to exploit opportunities to design 
for reliability, manufacturability and overall 
producibility.  Unlike the PM, the warfighters and user 
representatives are not likely familiar with these 
concerns.  They will concentrate on performance figures and 
production numbers.  Concepts like simplicity of design 
must be presented in terms of increased reliability, 
maintainability and operational availability.  Each of the 
system’s parts is in effect a building block with inherent 
reliability. 
Each of the participating programs reported the use of 
design tools that address reliability.  The effectiveness 
of these tools is of course to be determined over time with 
each systems usage.  But the acknowledgement of the need 
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for reliability enhancing tools in system design is a good 
thing. 
3. Contracting for Reliability 
If it is important put it in the contract.  To 
influence reliability design requirements, the contract 
must articulate their importance.  Motivation articulated 
through incentives is an effective strategy encouraging 
contractors to apply their best efforts on the issue. 
Contractual reliability incentive usage within the 
participating programs is encouraging.  Although less than 
half of the programs report the usage of incentives, the 
programs that have implemented incentives appear to have 
learned the lesson.  Their usage of award fees to focus the 
contractor’s efforts on reliability improvement is a 
positive step toward optimization of reliability. 
Overall, PMAs must realize that realize that many 
areas affect reliability and that participation with the 
contractor during system design is essential.  To influence 
design—put it in the contract and monitor contractor 
compliance.  Only through vigorous involvement can the PMA 
ensure and enforce the contractors focus on reliability. 
4. Reliability Test and Evaluation Activities 
There is a consistent cultural conflict between the 
test community and the PM shop.  However, test and 
evaluation (T&E) is an integral part of every program.  T&E 
is undertaken both to aid in the development of a system 
and to verify that a given product meets the standards as 
stated by the customer.  The respondent and interview 
comments indicate that PMAs generally think that some 
testers test to unrealistic mature reliability thresholds 
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before a system is allowed to mature, and do not have an 
appreciation for when the user needs are met. 
A defined reliability growth program is a helpful tool 
to help articulate the PM point of view.  A realistic 
growth strategy that develops as the product itself grows 
is prudent and would be useful to testers and decision 
makers alike.  The growth of system reliability cannot be 
taken for granted and must be consistently monitored and 
tested to ensure compliance with the user’s needs.  
Additional tests may be required either to verify product 
improvements or simply to obtain a reasonable confidence 
level in the system’s results. 
Although there is PMA appreciation for the risk that 
not meeting reliability requirements poses to a program, 
there is not a consistent pattern of risk management 
applied to reliability management.  Tailoring may again 
rightfully address why there is not a uniform set of 
procedures used to test reliability, but does not address 
the perception that the lack of reliability testing is 
knowingly accepted because of an unwillingness of PMs to 
receive bad news or accept schedule required adjustments. 
PM use of realistic reliability entrance criteria to 
stages of testing including OPEVAL, and having clearly 
articulated reliability KPPs are effective management tools 
and would help establish required reliability thresholds 
for which programs could strive.  A tailored selection of 
environmental and accelerated tests combined with an 
effective failure reporting system that incorporates 
corrective actions could be used to demonstrate a program’s 
seriousness when addressing reliability.  Experience 
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continues to demonstrate that it does little good to 
complete testing but fail to act upon the knowledge gained. 
A null hypothesis must be applied to vendor and 
program claims of MTBF levels.  The testers and PMAs must 
demand proof that a product will indeed perform in the DoD 
application to the claimed level.  This testing must be 
accomplished with a level of confidence that allows 
decision makers to make informed judgments about a system’s 
production and support requirements. 
 
D. RELIABILITY OF FIELDED SYSTEMS 
Success is too often believed to have occurred upon 
reaching a full rate production decision or upon initial 
fielding.  Even when the war fighting units have been fully 
outfitted, program management work remains.  Weapon systems 
and their logistic support structure must be carefully 
monitored, measured, and adjusted as appropriate. 
Collection of field reliability performance data is 
not uniform and hard to accomplish.  Warfighters are more 
concerned with performance measures than with logistical 
concerns, until there is a problem.  Once a problematic 
situation has risen to the attention of the fleet user the 
PMs job has gotten harder.  Programs that rely upon 
reactive means for identifying and correcting problems will 
terminally be on the defensive. 
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Proactive measures pay dividends in terms of the 
fleet’s Operational Availability (Ao).  However, those 
proactive programs do not come without a cost.  Resources 
in the form of time, money and technology must be spent to 
collect in-service equipment data.  Additional resources 
must then be applied to identify and implement corrective 
actions as required.  Unfortunately, logistical support of 
fielded systems is funded with operational support dollars 
and often insufficient to permit reliability improvements. 
Centrally collected data needs to be formulated in a 
manner that usefully reflects system reliability.  This 
data should be evaluated and acted upon.  The addition of a 
specific Flag-level reliability review would highlight the 
importance of reliability, and could improve the situation 
if the data is formulated as value added information.  If 
the acquisition and operational leadership is truly 
concerned with reliability as a life cycle cost driver 
their actions would speak volumes versus toothless 
statements placed within strategic plans. 
 
E. EFFECT OF ACQUISITION REFORM 
Three by-products of acquisition reform were cited as 
having negative effects on reliability of systems.  First, 
the implementation of performance based specifications 
replacing the Government standards that dictated 
reliability practices; Second, the reduction in the 
reliability workforce combined with streamlining; Third, 
the misuse or misunderstanding of commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) items.   
The shift away from Government documents towards 
commercial practices and industry standards certainly has 
had merit in some areas.  However, the general perception 
from the reliability duty experts was that no industry 
standard exists and that there is yet to be any gain from 
the use of commercial practices.  There are encouraging 
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areas, such as the increased application of HALT, but no 
consistent standards from which to measure. 
The significance of the workforce reduction is 
amplified when it is combined with the increased use of 
COTS.  COTS items are too often thought of as a quick and 
easy bolt on fix that requires little or no testing.  In 
reality, COTS items have not been designed for the 
warfighting environment and require reliability testing to 
ensure their success in the DoD application.  If a COTS 
item is then found to be lacking, appropriate modifications 
must be made in order to meet the user’s needs. 
The mentality toward COTS that “it already works, 
that’s why we are buying it” is ill informed and unwise.  
The commercial environment seldom demands the life 
expectancy too which DoD has become accustomed.  It has 
become common for DoD systems to be stretched beyond their 
initial service lives, which generally were longer than 
most businesses keep their capital equipment.  COTS usage 
can provide substantial benefits to DoD acquisition, but 
the COTS application must fit the requirement, the reverse 
is unacceptable. 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Program and reliability management personnel are 
charged with the responsibility of fielding reliable 
equipment to the nation’s warfighters and should be held 
accountable for that mission’s accomplishment.  This 
chapter provided an analysis of the reliability related 
data presented in the previous chapters.  Chapter V will 
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present synopsized answers to the research question and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this thesis was to provide strategic 
planners with insight collected from the experience of 
acquisition workforce professionals familiar with the 
issues relating to reliability management.  Application of 
the cumulative empirical evidence of these professionals 
permits a forward leaning proactive approach to the 
optimization of reliability within Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition programs. 
 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Synopsized answers to the research question are 
provided here.  Additional insight and information have 
been provided in Chapters II and IV. 
 
1. What Strategies Should Program Managers Implement 
to Optimize Reliability in Their Weapon System? 
Communicate and champion the optimization of 
reliability.  It is human nature to cultivate the areas 
where one is held accountable. 
Ensure requirements are grounded in reality and 
articulate reliability concerns early and often. 
Embrace testing as a value added dynamic.  Use all 
test and evaluation opportunities as learning and 
verification tools justifying required resources.  Apply 
test results to improve the system.  Problems identified 
through testing (even if they are only a matter of 
perception) already exist and would have been found 
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eventually.  Treat those identified problems as knowledge 
gained. 
Assume the null hypothesis that the contractors’ 
reliability claims are flawed until proven otherwise.  This 
does not predetermine an adversarial relationship with a 
contractor but clearly articulates the Government’s 
position form the start. 
Optimize trade-offs with respect to reliability and 
fully appreciate the cause and effect relationship 
decisions today will have on the fleet tomorrow. 
Build a team of professionals skilled and educated on 
issues of reliability so that they may permeate the program 
articulating and implementing a sound acquisition strategy 
reflective of life cycle concerns. 
 
2. What is Reliability and What is its Significance 
within Acquisition Management? 
Reliability is the probability an item will perform 
its intended functions for a specified period under stated 
conditions. 
Reliability is the fundamental building block that 
supports the warfighter.  It directly supports the 
operational availability of systems and is the significant 
driver of life cycle costs.  System logistical support is 
based upon the expected component and total system 
reliabilities.  Poor reliability or inaccurate estimates of 
reliability significantly increase life cycle costs and 
affects every aspect of logistics elements. 
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3. What Policies and Regulations Governing 
Reliability Management are Available to Program 
Managers (PM)? 
DoD 5000.2-R is the overarching regulatory document 
requiring Program Managers to establish and execute 
reliability activities and measurable requirements within 
their acquisition programs.  However, since the issuance of 
the Secretary Perry’s memo on specifications and standards 
reform most of the guidance on reliability has purposely 
become vague.  Therefore there are no governing documents 
that provide procedural guidance to the Program Managers. 
In their absence the managers, and engineers 
responsible for reliability, use a number of discretionary 
guides from the Defense Systems Management College, 
‘toolkits’ from the Reliability Analysis Center, and the 
cancelled reliability military specs and handbooks.  The 
draft copy of the SECNAVINST 5000.2C reportedly makes the 
most significant advance in the area of R&M since the 
advent of acquisition reform.  Hopefully its release will 
regain some of the reliability ground lost. 
 
4. What Significant Factors Contribute to Weapon 
System Reliability? 
First and foremost system reliability stems from 
command attention.  In terms of product development, the 
design process and requirements generation phases provide 
the critical reliability foundation.  Following a credible 
design, the development and manufacturing processes must be 
formulated and adjusted to enhance the inherent reliability 
of the product being produced.  A proactive reliability 
plan combined with applied lessons learned from testing 
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iterations will significantly enhance the opportunity for a 
reliable system success. 
Additionally, the use of contractual incentives, KPPs, 
and entrance criteria linked to reliability thresholds will 
help raise the level of effort applied to the life cycle 
cost driver; reliability. 
 
5. What Strategies are Currently Used to Monitor 
Reliability within an Acquisition Program? 
The research identified no uniform strategy 
specifically aimed at monitoring reliability.  Programs use 
a variety of methods to track reliability including 
reliability program plans, reliability integrated product 
teams, major program reviews, developmental and operational 
test reports.  Additionally, some programs have 
incorporated semi-annual reliability meetings or reports 
and encourage three to six month reliability reviews on 
field equipment. 
 
6. How can the Program Office Mitigate Risk 
Associated with Reliability Throughout the 
Acquisition Life Cycle? 
Understand and articulate the significance of 
reliability with respect to life cycle costs and its affect 
on the warfighter. 
Review policies, actions and decisions through the 
eyes of the warfighter with respect to reliability and 
operational availability; take corrective action as 
required and recognize and reward successes when they 
occur. 
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Develop and enforce a means to measure and evaluate 
performance as it relates to reliability.  This applies 
throughout the life cycle inclusive of fielded systems.  
For systems in development use of real-world test 
conditions and large enough sample sizes for high 
confidence statements is required. 
 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to answering the research questions, this 
thesis has lead to the following highlighted topics: 1) 
Reliability Management Culture; 2) Reliability Test and 
Evaluation; 3) Reliability Standards.  Each of these topics 
is presented with a conclusion and a corresponding 
recommendation. 
 
1. Reliability Management Culture 
Conclusion: 
Reliability management exists in an environment that 
does not recognize its value or reward its successes. 
PMs are evaluated solely on cost, schedule and 
performance in the production arena.  Unfortunately, 
reliability optimization costs both in terms of budget and 
time, and reliability is generally not regarded as a 
performance item.  Conceptually the acquisition workforce 
recognizes reliability as a significant issue but it is 
lost in the crisis management atmosphere that encompasses 
under funded acquisition management. 
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There is no effective champion for reliability issues.  
Admittedly, the Defense Department is not designed for 
efficiency but rather works on a system of checks and 
balances and under funded budgeting practices.  However, 
the acknowledgement of reliability as a life cycle cost 
driver warrants the implementation of proactive measures. 
Recommendation: 
DoD/DoN leadership should develop a performance 
measure and reward structure that acknowledges life cycle 
support equal to or higher to the current cost, schedule 
and performance system. 
Cultural change is required.  A reliability and life 
cycle focused education must be incorporated into the 
acquisition workforce profession.  Specific reliability 
attention must be given to the PM and the logistician 
profession. 
A champion for reliability must emerge.  Consideration 
should be given to a flag level position of a Reliability 
CZAR. 
Additionally, the Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary (DAES), which requires Program Managers to address 
cost, schedule, and performance, should also include 
Operational Availability (A .  The fourth dimension of 
availability should mandate an AO level identifying the 
agreed upon target. 
 
2. Reliability Test and Evaluation 
Conclusion: 
The relationship between program management and test 
and evaluation personnel is often adversarial beyond 
independence. 
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Testing is truly a value added event that is required 
for effective reliability management.  However, the current 
bounds of the PPBS and the zero defect mentality that many 
programs face does not encourage testing.  Often decision 
points and funding sources are inflexible leading PMs to 
compress or cut testing to inadequate levels. 
Recommendation: 
DoD/DoN leadership should reevaluate the rigidity that 
exists in our funding and decision cycles and encourage a 
knowledge gained approach to testing. 
PMs need to embrace the lessons learned through 
testing and allow the corrective actions to be retested to 
ensure the desired results have been obtained.  If the 
negative connotation of “failing” a DT test is prevalent 
then we have missed the entire learning point of trying to 
improve the system. 
Developmental testers should be integrated into the 
development team and not relegated to messenger duty when 
problems or issues arise.  DT should be the PMs truth 
finder concerning reliability claims. 
 
3. Reliability Standards 
Conclusion: 
The discipline of reliability continues to depend on 
the outdated cancelled MIL-STDs. 
The era of dominant military standards ended with the 
implementation of specification and standard reform.  
Although these standards continue to provide helpful 
information they are no longer updated or reviewed.  No 
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commercial standard has emerged to replace the 
Government’s. 
Recommendation: 
DoD/DoN should work with commercial and industry 
sources to develop a comprehensive standard encompassing 
reliability management practices from a life cycle cost 
perspective that would be interdisciplinary in nature and 
applicable to the PM, reliability engineer, logistician, 
operational and developmental testers alike. 
 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Reliability Program Plan 
Research in this area should examine and analyze 
existing PMA Reliability Program Plans.  While many 
programs have established plans, none were provided to this 
researcher.  Plans should be reviewed for content and 
degree of compliance in program execution. 
2. Reliability Management in Other DoD Programs 
Future research should analyze methods used in other 
areas of DoD acquisition.  This thesis concentrated on 
Naval Aviation programs limiting the scope and focus.  
Similar analysis should be applied to other acquisition 
areas in order to identify any stove piped lessons learned.  
Additionally, comparative research can be applied to 
reliability management throughout the differing services or 
acquisition management areas within a service. 
3. Reliability Management in Commercial Aviation 
Programs 
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Future research should examine reliability management 
and practices used in commercial aviation program 
management.  Commercial aviation not only has experience in 
producing reliable equipment but in its in-service 
operation as well.  Lessons learned should be collected and 
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APPENDIX A.  WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY PERFORMANCE SURVEY 
 
Directions: This survey is being conducted to support research as part 
of a Naval Postgraduate School Thesis on challenges in managing weapon 
system reliability performance.  The results of this thesis are 
intended to directly benefit any PM that is, or will be managing 
complex programs, by identifying common reliability management issues 
and potential pitfalls, why they occur, risk mitigation techniques, 
lessons learned, and suggestions for improved methods for managing and 
reducing the inherent risks associated with achieving stated 
reliability performance requirements.   
 
The research is limited to a cross-section of systems in various stages 
of the acquisition process that are managed within the Naval Air 
Systems Command.  The analysis is limited to an assessment of 
reliability management and process issues, and does not specifically 
address commodity or technology driven reliability problems.   
 
Please answer the following questions and email them back NLT 01 Feb 
2002.  A separate survey is required to be filled out for each 
participating program. 
e-mail:  glmasiel@nps.navy.mil   
 
** Results will be represented in aggregate form, not program specific 
** 
 
Project/Program Management Office:select here (click on dropdown list) 




Program/System Name:select here (click on dropdown list)   




Current Life Cycle Phase: 
Old 5000 
 Phase 0  (CE      ) 
 Phase I  (PDRR      )  
 Phase II (EMD specify prior to or post LRIP     ) 
 Phase III(Specify if prior to or post IOC-if post IOC how long has it 
been in the field?      years) 
 
New 5000 
 MS A (specify CE or CAD      ) 
 MS B (specify SI or SDD      )  
 MS C (specify LRIP or FRP      ) 
 Operations & Support  (how long has it been in the field?      years) 
 
 Other or N/A (     ) 
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Required Reliability/Availability: (specify reliability 
requirement/measure in terms of MTBF, MTBCMF, MTBOMF, MTBMA, AO, etc…) 
 ORD (state value e.g. 300 hrs MTBF, 95% AO)       
 Contract (state value)       
 Other (state value)       
 
Measured Reliability/Availability: (quantify measured reliability 
results consistent with measures/units from above, e.g. 300 hrs MTBF, 
95% AO)  
 DT  results:       Passed? Y  N  
 RQT/RDGT  results:       Passed? Y  N  
 OT  results:       Passed? Y  N  
 Field Data results:       (how collected:      ) 
 Contractor claims :       
 Other     results:       Passed? Y  N  
      (state type of test:     ) 
 
Has the system experienced any major reliability test failures?  (i.e. 
failed DT or IOTE reliability performance requirements) Yes   No   










Please answer the following survey questions. 
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Survey Questions: (please answer all questions.  If a question does not 
apply to your program due to its current acquisition phase, please 
answer based on experiences encountered in prior phases.  Check all 
boxes that apply.  I have left room after each question for additional 
commentary if you find it necessary) 
 
1. How is the system reliability program and corresponding management 
approach to such formally documented within your program?  (check only 
the primary overriding document) 
 Reliability Program Plan   Contract SOW  TEMP  
SAMP(SingleAcqMgmtPlan 
 No formal reliability management plan  Other (explain:      ) 
Additional comments:       
 
2. Who within your organization is primarily responsible for 
reliability activities for this particular program?  (check only one) 
 PM 
 Project Leader 
 Systems Engineering Team Lead 
 Logistics/Supportability Team Lead 
 Test Team Lead 
 Reliability IPT (formally chartered IPT? Y   N ) 
 Prime Contractor 
 No one specifically 
 Other (please explain      ) 
Additional comments:       
 
3. What contractual design tools were/are employed to ensure 
reliability is “built in” early on in the program?  (check all that 
apply) 
 Physics of Failure (POF) techniques 
 Critical Items List/Analysis (i.e. complex, state-of-the-art  
  technology, high cost, single source, or single failure point 
component) 
 Identification of potential reliability problems (i.e. known 
  reliability problem areas) 
 Software Reliability Assessment 
 Quality Function Deployment   (explain:     ) 
 Parts Control Program 
 FMECA, FRACAS, Fault Tree Analysis 
 Other (describe:     )  
Additional comments:       
 
4. Identify the types of test activities that have or will be used to 
determine compliance as part of your system’s reliability program.  
(check all that apply) 
 Environmental Testing 
 Accelerated Testing (e.g. HALT) 
 Reliability Development Growth Test (RDGT) 
 Reliability Qualification/Demonstration Test (RQT or RDT) 
 Government Developmental Testing 
 Operational Testing  (type, i.e. LUT/OPTEMPO/IOT/FOT      ) 
 Other (describe:      ) 





5. Is the amount of time and funding allotted for reliability testing 
during DT sufficient for your program? (for systems beyond DT, 
answer in terms of how your program was postured going into DT at the 
time) 
 Current schedule and available funds are sufficient (low risk 
now) 
 Could use more time/$$ to reduce risk (medium/high risk now) 
 No comment 
Additional comments:       
 
6. Does your program incorporate a reliability growth program? 
 Yes (where is this detailed?      ) 
 No 
 N/A (check this only if system is already fielded and there are no 
  current plans for improving the inherent system reliability) 
Additional comments:       
 
7. If your system has already participated in an OPEVAL, did your 
success in either DT or RD/GT (or other reliability testing) correlate 
with success in IOTE?  (check all that apply) 
 Yes, success in pre-OPEVAL reliability testing led to reliability 
requirements being fully met in OPEVAL 
 Not completely, system did well in pre-OPEVAL reliability testing, 
but had some new problems during OPEVAL that needed correcting 
 Not at first, system passed OPEVAL after # attempts (click on 
dropdown list) 
 N/A, system has not yet been involved in an operational test 
Additional comments:       
 
   a.  To what level was your system’s ORD reliability requirement 
demonstrated (state in terms of % of ORD requirement met) 
During DT?   During OT? 
 100%    100% 
 >80%    >80% 
 >60%    >60% 
 >40%    >40% 
 >20%    >20% 
 <20%    <20% 
 
8. Does (or did) your program have specific OPEVAL entrance criteria 
relative to reliability? 
 Yes  (provide details:      )   
 No 
Additional comments:       
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9. Have the User, Tester, Contractor, and PMO all agreed upon the 
method (model) to be used in reliability calculations? 
 Yes  (where is this documented, e.g. contract, TEMP, SEP??      ) 
 No 
 Not sure 
Additional comments:       
 
10. Is Reliability identified as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) in 
the system Operational Requirements Document? 
 Yes 
 No   
 
   a. If not a KPP, for systems still in development, where is 
reliability ranked in terms of requirements? (Relative priority) 
 Highest tier priority (Band A) 
 Middle tier priority (Band B) 
 Lower tier (Band C or below)   
Additional comments:       
 
11. Were you as the Material Developer able to influence incorporation 
of realistic reliability requirements as part of the ORD process?? 
 No, OPNAV N78 developed requirements independently 
 Yes, input was provided and included part of IPT process 
 Other (explain:      ) 
Additional comments:       
 
12. Was reliability included as a factor in the source selection 
process? 
 Yes (provide details      ) Was it a significant discriminator? Y  N
 
 No 
Additional comments:       
 
   a.  How are ORD reliability requirements for your program translated 
into actual contractual reliability requirements?  (base on last 
contract awarded) 
 ORD paragraphs relative to reliability are restated in SOW/Spec (i.e. 
contract requirement is equal to ORD requirement) 
 Additional levels of reliability are applied to the contract  
  (briefly describe process)       
 Comprehensive reliability requirements are not adequately stated in 
the contract 
 Other  (explain:      ) 
 
13. Are there incentives employed in the contract that are specifically 
tied to achieving system reliability performance requirements? 
 Yes  (describe:      ) 
 No 
 
   a.  If yes, did these incentives achieve their desired effect? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Too early to tell 
Additional comments:       
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14. Are you aware of any specific DoD or Navy policy/regulation 
regarding weapon system reliability management? 
 Yes  (if yes, which do you use to help you manage reliability?      ) 
 No 
 Not sure  
Additional comments:       
 
15. What risk mitigation techniques does your program employ that 
address system reliability performance issues? 
Briefly describe:       
Additional comments:       
 
 
16. How do you measure and track reliability performance progress over 
time in your program? (check all that apply) 
 By contractor projections/analysis 
 Reliability growth tracking methodology 
 At major reviews (PDR, CDR, TRRs, etc…) 
 Other  (please specify:      ) 
Additional comments:       
 
17. In your opinion, has acquisition streamlining (e.g. performance 
specifications, use of COTS, etc…) and/or the continued trend of 
government downsizing contributed either directly or indirectly towards 
reliability shortfalls experienced by programs in general? 
 Yes, acquisition streamlining (provide details:       
 Yes, government downsizing   (provide details:       
 Yes, both  (provide details:       
 No 
 No comment  
 
   a. If COTS/NDI components were/are utilized in the design of your 
system, did the COTS components realize the reliability performance 
claims of the OEM? 
 Met 
 Exceeded 
 Less  (provide details, e.g. problems with integration, use in 
military  
   environment, improper claims, etc… :     ) 
 N/A (no COTS/NDI in system design) 
Additional comments:       
 
   b. Given the realities of streamlining and downsizing, do you 
believe the Navy reliability community has adequately compensated with 
alternative policies, processes and tools? 
 Yes 
 No 
 No comment  
 
   c. Do you have any suggestions for improvement? (explain:      ) 





18. For “fielded” systems only, please answer the following: 
 
   a. Was or is your program fielded in a “conditional materiel 
release” status due in part from failure to meet ORD RAM requirements? 
 Yes (is CMR still in effect? Yes  No ) 
 No 
Additional comments:       
 
   b. How is collection of reliability field data performed to gather 
failure and repair histories?  
 Depot or CLS Maintenance records 
 Warranty data gives us this information 
 Reliability data not formally collected 
 Other  (explain:      ) 
 
 
   c.  Does current field reliability data indicate your system still 
meets or exceeds the ORD reliability requirement? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Reliability data not formally collected 
Additional comments:       
 
   d.  Has any of the reliability failure data collected led to 
identification of O&S cost drivers that subsequently led to cost 
effective improvements? 
 Yes  (if significant improvements, please expand upon:      ) 
 No  
Additional comments:       
 
   e.  Is there a formal reliability improvement program for your 
system? 
 Yes (if yes, where documented?      ) 
 No  
Additional comments:       
 
   f.  Does your system employ a Reliability Centered Maintenance 
program?  
 Yes (if yes, how is it formally implemented?      ) 
 No 
Additional comments:       
  
19. Does your program employ or leverage any commercial best practices 
in terms of reliability performance management?  (e.g. physics of 
failure, predictive technologies, prognostics/life consumption 
monitoring,  identification and mitigation of failure modes/mechanisms 
(FMECA), accelerated life testing, growth testing, selection of 
reliable parts)  
 Yes  (identify:      ) 
 No 





20. Rank order the following reliability management problems: 
(click on dropdown list for each) 
   Reliability is not a KPP 
   Contractor not designing for reliability sufficiently above 
requirement 
   Contractors not using best commercial practices 
   Not aggressively “designing-in” reliability upfront 
   Poor reliability planning and growth planning (test too late) 
   Inadequate policies and guidance (need updating) 
   Insufficient reliability testing to verify requirements 
   Unrealistic reliability requirements with inadequate rationale 
   Need more qualified personnel in reliability management 
   Not consistently improving reliability after fielding 
   Other  (fill in your own:      ) 
Additional comments:       
 
Please provide any other comments, observations, or lessons learned 
that you would like to share here (use additional sheet if necessary:  
thank you for your time and support in filling out this survey. 
  100
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Blanchard, Benjamin S., Fabrycky, Wolter J., Systems 
Engineering and Analysis, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ, 1998 
 
2. Cohen, M.L., Rolph, J.E., Steffey, D.L. Editors, 
Statistics, Testing and Defense Acquisition: New 
Approaches and Methodological Improvements, National 
Research Council, Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1998 
 
3. Chase, R., Aquilano, N., Jacobs, F., Operations 
Management for Competetive Advantage, 9th ed., McGraw-
Hill, New York, NY, 2001 
 
4. CP3-3 Component Reliability Objectives Briefing, Naval 
Air Systems Team, 19 February 2002  
 
5. Crow, K. A., Designing for Reliability, 1997, 
[http://npd-solutions.com/lifecycle.htm] 
 
6. Defense Systems Management College, Risk Management 
Guide for DoD Acquisition, 4th ed., Defense Systems 
Management College Press, Fort Belvoir, VA, February 
2001 
 
7. Defense Systems Management College, Acquisition 
Logistics Guide, 3rd ed., Defense Systems Management 
College Press, Fort Belvoir, VA, Dec 1997 
 
8. Defense Systems Management College, Test and 
Evaluation Management Guide, 2nd ed., Defense Systems 
Management College Press, Fort Belvoir, VA, Dec 1993 
 
9. Defense Systems Management College, Systems 
Engineering Management Guide, Defense Systems 
Management College Press, Fort Belvoir, VA, January 
1990 
 
10. Defense Systems Management College, Glossary of 
Defense Acquisition Acronyms & Terms, 8th ed., Defense 




11. Desiderio, George, Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, OUSD 





12. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 
FY2000 Annual Report, February 2001 
 
13. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 
FY1999 Annual Report, February 2000 
 
14. DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs  
C5.2.3.5.8. Reliability, Availability and 




15. DoDD 5000.1; The Defense Acquisition System; 




16. Doertenbach, Neil, QualMark Corporation, Highly 
Accelerated Life Testing – Testing With a Different 
Purpose, 25 July 2000, 
[http://www.link2semi.com/articles/qual725001_p.html] 
 
17. Eaton, Donald R., Logistics Chair, Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Electronic Mail Correspondence, 25 April 2001 
 
18. Elsayed, Elsayed A., Reliability Engineering, Addison 
Wesley Longman, Inc., Reading, MA, 1996 
 
19. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-0-199, Best 
Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes, July 2000 
 
20. Kang, Keebom, DoD Inventory Management Culture Changes 
and Training in Commercial Practices, Research Paper 
NPS-SM-98-002, March 1998 
 
  102
21. Lecture Notes from Strategic Planning and Policy, 
MN4470, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 
2001 
 
22. Lecture Notes from Intermediate Systems Acquisition 
Course, ACQ 201, Defense Acquisition University, Fort 
Belvoir, VA, March 1997 
 
23. Lewis, E. E., Introduction to Reliability engineering, 
2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1996 
 
24. McMaster, Charles F., Streamlining PPBS to Support a 
Responsive System Acquisition Process, United States 
Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 10 April 2000 
 
25. MIL-HDBK-781A, Handbook for Reliability Test Methods, 
Plans, and Environments for Engineering, Development 
Qualification, and Production, 01 Apr 1996 
 
26. MIL-STD-785B, Reliability Program for Systems and 
Equipment Development and Production, 15 Sep 1980 
 
27. Montgomery, Douglas C., Introduction to Statistical 
Quality Control, 4th ed., John Wiley & Sons, INC., New 
York, NY, 2001 
 
28. Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Aviation Systems Team 
Strategic Plan 2000-2005, Patuxent River, MD, Undated 
 
29. Naval Aviation Logistics Command Mgmt Information 





30. NAVAIR Reliability & Maintainability Web site, 
Acquisition Timeline, [http://140.229.206.184] 
 
31. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG, Operating and Support 
Estimating Guide.  
[http://www.dtic.mil/pae/paeosg01.html] 
 
32. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition, The Naval 
  103
Research, Development & Acquisition Team 1999-2004 
Strategic Plan, Washington, D.C., Undated 
 
33. Office of the Inspector General Department of Defense, 
V-22 Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical Aircraft, Report 
No. D-2000-174, 15 August 2000 
 
34. Perry, William J., Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, 
Specifications and Standards – A New Way of Doing 
Business, 29 June 1994 
 
35. Phillips, John F., “Contracting for Assured Support to 
the Warfighter,” Briefing for Navy Acquisition 
Conference, 03 May 2001. 
[http://www.abm.rda.hq.navy.mil/searchpage.cfm]  
 
36. Quarterdeck Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis Web 
site, [http://qtrdeck.nalda.navy.mil/] 
 
37. Reliability Toolkit: Commercial Practices Edition, 
Systems Reliability Division, Rome Laboratory Air 
Force Material Command, Rome, NY, 1995 
 
38. Rome Laboratory Reliability Engineer’s Toolkit: An 
Application Oriented Guide for the Practicing 
Reliability Engineer, Systems Reliability Division, 
Rome Laboratory Air Force Material Command, Rome, NY, 
1993 
 
39. Ryan, Michael E., The Reliability Challenge:  Common 
Pitfalls, and Strategies for Maximizing Inherent 
reliability Performance Of Weapon Systems, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Master’s Thesis, Monterey, CA, 
December 2001 
 
40. Society of Automotive Engineers International, 
Reliability, Maintainability, and Supportability 
Newsletter, 1990 
 
41. Stevens, Roger T., Operational Test & Evaluation; A 
Systems Engineering Process, Robert E, Krieger 
Publishing Company, Malabar, FL, 1979 
 
42. What is Acquisition Reform? Defense Systems Management 
College, Ft Belvoir, VA, accessed 12 February 2002 
[http://www.dsmc.dsm.mil/jdam/contents/whatis.html 
  104
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education 
MCCDC, Code C46 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center 
MCCDC, C4ORC 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: 
Operations Officer) 
Camp Pendleton, California 
 
7. RADM Donald R Eaton (Ret.) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
8. Professor Lee Edwards 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
9. Professor David Lamm 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
10. Mr. Andrew N. Monje 
Director R&M Division 
Naval Aviation Systems Command 
Patuxent River, MD 
  105
